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FAMOUS TRADEMARKS AND THE RATIONAL BASIS
FOR PROTECTING "IRRATIONAL BELIEFS"
Shahar J. Dilbary
ABSTRACT
Contrary to the traditional view, this article argues that mega-brands
are neither economic evils nor limited to imparting information about the
products they adom. It also rejects the view that famous marks persuade
"snobs" to "irrationally" pay more for the same physical product they could
have purchased for less. Rather, it adopts the view that in purchasing a
branded good, the consumer is actually purchasing a bundle of three prod-
ucts: a physical product, information about the physical product, and an
intangible product, such as fame, prestige, peace of mind, or a pleasant feel-
ing. This article explores the demand for the intangible product and its im-
pact on pricing, welfare, and the strategies of consumers and producers. It
concludes that under certain conditions one may witness the anomaly of an
increase in both price and output. Further, contrary to conspicuous goods
theory, this analysis shows that snobbism may occur in the traditional
downward-sloping demand curves and is not limited to goods with con-
spicuous properties.
A direct implication of this analysis is that mega-brands neither confer
a monopoly nor foster price discrimination. On the contrary, they enhance
competition in both the physical and intangible spheres. Further, the analy-
sis provides a rational basis for anti-dilution law. Anti-dilution law-
widely considered to protect producers and injure consumers-actually
inures to the benefit of both groups. Finally, this analysis shows that even
snobs are rational, and that there are sound economic justifications for the
law's unique protection of famous marks.
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toral Candidate (J.S.D.), University of Chicago; LL.M., University of Chicago; J.D., Bar-Ilan Univer-
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INTRODUCTION
"The primary value of the modern trademark lies in the conditioned reflex developed in the
buyer .... To the extent that advertising of this type succeeds, .... economically irrational
elements are introduced into consumer choices; and the trademark owner is insulated from
the normal pressures of price and quality competition. In consequence the competitive sys-
tem fails to perform its function of allocating available resources efficiently. Moreover, the
economically irrelevant appeal of highly publicized trademarks is thought to constitute a
barrier to the entry of new competition into the market .... In some markets this barrier to
entry may be insuperable." - Judge Browning in Smith v. Chanel.,
"[P]eople like to get what they think they are getting, and courts have steadfastly refused in
this class of cases to demandjustification for their preferences. Shoddy and petty motives
may control those preferences, but if the buyers wish to be snobs, the law will protect them
in their snobbery." - Judge Hand in Benton Announcements.
2
"[T/he public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice
or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance." -Justice Cardozo in Algoma Lumber.
3
This article seeks to answer two basic questions: First, why are some
consumers (often referred to as "snobs")4 willing to pay more for a product
simply because it bears a famous trademark? And second, should the law
protect snobs' preferences? The law's answer to the first question is that
snobs are irrational because celebrated trademarks5 and persuasive advertis-
ing' play upon their susceptibilities.7 Famous trademarks have also been
accused of other economic evils: enhancing product differentiation, raising
barriers of entry, and wasting resources that could have been used to pro-
duce "real goods."' At the same time, however, the law protects these irra-
tional preferences and thus enables branded products to command higher
prices than identical non-branded goods.' The law does so by securing con-
' Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cit. 1968) (footnotes and citations omitted).
2 Benton Announcements, Inc. v. FTC, 130 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1942).
3 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
4 See, e.g., E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943); Benton
Announcements, 130 F.2d at 255. In using the term "snob," I do not take any moral stand but merely
describe a phenomenon.
5 I use the term "trademark" here in a broad sense to include all trade symbols.
6 By "persuasive advertising" I mean advertising that does not directly provide information about
the physical product it adorns. See also infra notes 19, 24-32 and accompanying text.
7 See Algoma Lumber, 291 U.S. at 78; Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968);
Benton Announcements, 130 F.2d at 255; infra notes 24, 27-29 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
9 Protecting famous marks is, in fact, protecting snobbism. The law protects both, as is evident
from the excerpts above. Algoma Lumber, 291 U.S. at 78; Chanel, 402 F.2d at 567; Benton Announce-
ments, 130 F.2d at 255. See also E. Wine, 137 F.2d at 958 ("There appears to be a related judicial policy
of protecting snobbism ... ").
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sumers' "misperception" that physically identical products are, in fact, dif-
ferent. Trademark anti-dilution law, for example, protects famous marks
(but not "regular" ones) against erosion of their image.'0 It thus maintains
the very magnetism that distinguishes branded from generic products.
Trade-name law achieves the same end by prohibiting sellers from using
misdescriptive terms to inform consumers that physically identical, but
differently branded, products are in fact the same." This approach-the
law's protection of consumers' "irrationality" through its protection of fa-
mous trademarks-is perplexing. Why should the law protect snobbery if it
leads to anticompetitive outcomes? Should not the law be aimed at break-
ing down what it regards to be irrational preferences of the buying public?
The puzzle is even greater because "protecting" capricious decisions, on its
face, injures the very consuming public whose welfare the law seeks to
promote. 2
This article offers an economic rationale for the law's protection of
famous marks. It begins by challenging the assumption that consumers'
willingness to pay more for branded products is irrational. It argues that
branding (a term I use for both famous marks and the persuasive advertis-
ing that promotes them) is an economic good, not a "bad,"' 3 and consum-
ers' seemingly caprice-driven decisions are, in fact, rational and welfare
maximizing. The article is based on the recognition that when purchasing a
branded good, the consumer receives three bundled products: a physical
product (e.g., a watch, a car, or a pocketbook), information about the physi-
10 See infra Part I.B. Anti-dilution protects a famous trademark against two types of image-
eroding activities: tarnishment and blurring. Tarnishment occurs when a famous mark is portrayed in an
unsavory manner, thereby replacing a positive image with a negative one (e.g., using the "Rolls Royce"
mark in connection with the sale of sex products). Blurring is a dilution of the mark's uniqueness. It
occurs when a famous mark is used in connection with the sale of numerous products (e.g., using the
"Rolls Royce" mark for radio tubes, restaurants, etc.) See Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d
333, 333 (3d Cir. 1925); infra Part III.B.
11 The following example, based on FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933), is illustra-
tive. Assume snobs prefer to purchase high-priced flour from mills rather than low-priced flour from
sellers who do not mill it themselves, even though the two types of flour are physically identical. If the
law allowed non-millers to use the word "Mill" falsely in their trade-names, consumers would be misled
because they would believe that the seller had milled its own flour. But the consumers would be misled
to their financial benefit: they would receive the very physical product they intended to purchase at a
lower price. At the same time, millers would not be worse off: absent passing off, the millers would still
be able to reap the fruits of their investments. In a number of decisions, however, the Supreme Court has
prohibited sellers from including such misdescriptive terms in their trade-names. The result is that, on
its face, by protecting consumer snobbery, the law harms them.
12 See supra note 11.
13 Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory ofAdvertising as a Good or Bad, 108 Q.
J. ECON. 941, 941 (1993). The authors define a "good" as "something consumers are willing to pay for,"
and a "bad" as "something consumers pay to have removed or must be compensated to accept." Id.
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cal product (e.g., its constituent materials, durability, and the mode of its
manufacture), and an intangible product, such as fame, prestige, peace of
mind, or just a pleasant feeling.
Part I discusses the three most common schools of thought on brand-
ing: the "hard-liners," who believe that consumers are irrational and that
branding is a waste; the "soft-liners," who value branding only to the extent
that it provides information about a product's physical qualities; and the
"middle-liners," who recognize the psychological effects and benefits of
branding. Part II discusses the legal protection accorded to famous marks
and snobbish preferences. It concludes that courts and jurists have adopted
a hard-line premise (famous marks are harmful) but a soft-line conclusion
(famous marks, and thus snobbism, should be protected).
Part III undertakes to resolve the inconsistency in the law by adopting
the middle-liner's view that a branded product is, in actuality, a bundle of
three products, arguing that the intangible product of that bundle has social
value. It then explores the normative and positive implications of this ex-
planation on the laws of trademark anti-dilution and price discrimination.
Anti-dilution has been described as "wholly resistent [sic] to analysis"' 4 and
injurious to consumers. 5 Conversely, this article argues that anti-dilution
inures to the benefit of both consumers and producers. For the producer, it
is forward looking, protecting the ability of a famous trademark to generate
future sales. For the consumer, it is backward looking, protecting her pre-
purchase expectations and the value of the intangible product she pur-
chased. Dilution imposes an externality because a third party may cause the
consumer an injury if he tarnishes the pleasant aura for which the consumer
paid.
Part III also offers a new interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act in
order to square price discrimination law-which is intended to ensure that
identical products are sold at the same price-with trademark law, which,
by protecting the allure of mega-brands, enables sellers of branded product
to charge higher prices than those charged for generic goods. Persuasive
branding, however, neither confers a monopoly nor fosters price discrimi-
nation. Competition exists both in the physical and intangible spheres. In
the intangible sphere, a Cartier watch, a Ferrari car, and a Gucci bag all
compete for the attention of the buyer who wishes to purchase status. Be-
14 Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution Law: At a Crossroad? Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits
of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 122 (1993).
15 See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169, 1172, 1180-84 (1948). Opponents of anti-dilution argue that it
harms competition and that it leads to artificial product differentiation thereby raising consumer prices.
See id. In their view, protecting persuasive advertising (as opposed to informative) interferes with the
consumer's free choice and disposes the consumer of his income. See id.
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cause physically identical articles may carry different intangible freights,
the law should allow a producer to charge different prices for physically
identical products bearing different marks without being suspected of en-
gaging in a discriminatory activity or being subject to an antitrust inquiry.
Part IV constructs a formal model which breaks down the demand for
a branded product into the three components. Unlike the prevailing litera-
ture on advertising, this model does not assume that branding "give[s] fa-
vorable notice" to other goods.16 It also deviates from signaling models
which argue that the role of branding is limited to imparting information
about the physical product that advertisements endorse. 7 Instead it assumes
that branding creates a new intangible good that must piggyback on the
physical one. The model explains why branding occurs in markets with
incomplete information as well as in perfectly competitive markets. It dif-
fers from the economic literature on conspicuous goods in two important
ways. First, it does not limit itself to visible goods and so can explain con-
sumers' willingness to pay for branded products which are visible to others
as well as branded yet inconspicuous goods. Second, the model does not
assume that snobs face an upward-sloping demand curve. Rather, the model
demonstrates that under certain conditions, one may witness the anomaly of
an increase in both price and output, but that such phenomena may occur in
the traditional downward sloping demand curves. Unlike previous ap-
proaches, this model provides a theoretical framework that takes into ac-
count both the informational and persuasive values of branding. Part V
offers concluding remarks.
I. THE APPROACHES TO PERSUASIVE BRANDING
Persuasive branding comprises a large segment of the economy. Ju-
rists, psychologists, and economists have tried to explain the purposes
served by ever-growing advertising outlays and to measure their impact on
consumption, culture, and welfare. Many have reached the conclusions that
branding's sole purpose is to serve producers and that it is nothing more
than a drain on the economy. 8 Why do producers invest so much money on
16 Becker & Murphy, supra note 13, at 942, 945. Becker and Murphy argue that advertisements
raise the demand for physical goods. Id. This article adopts the view that they create a new intangible
product.
17 This approach is mainly attributed to Phillip Nelson. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
18 If this spending is a drain, it is an enormous one. In 2003 alone, the top 100 international mar-
keters increased their advertising expenditures by 11.6% to $82.83 billion. Craig Endicott, Top Market-
ers Spend $83 Billion; P&G, Unilever Are Top Spenders; China Drives Asia/Pacific Gains,
ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 8, 2004, at 30. This increase came following a 7.1% increase in 2002 and a
2.6% decline in 2001. Id. Of these 100 marketers, 25 spent more than $1 billion on advertising in 2003.
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advertising containing very little or no direct information? Is branding de-
sirable? This Part addresses these questions.
A. The "Hard-Liners:" Branding Is a "Bad"
Some economists take a hard-line position against branding, calling
for its eradication. They believe that it is merely a wasteful attempt 9 to
change consumers' preferences,2" increase barriers to entry,21 and promote
artificial product differentiation.22 Brands and brand loyalty are said to lead
to the creation of monopolies and thus enable manufacturers to command
supra-competitive prices and insulate themselves from the chills and fevers
of competition.23 Some maintain that persuasive advertising is even im-
Id. U.S.-based fums (defined by headquarter location) accounted for $40.36 billion of the 2003 total for
the largest marketers. Id. Advertising spending for the top 200 mega-brands accounted for $41.4 billion
of the $128.4 billion in domestic advertising spending in 2003. Mark Schumann, Megabrands; Verizon
Again Leads Big Telecom, Auto Megabrand Spenders, ADVERTISING AGE, July 19, 2004, at S1. In 2001
and 2002, several major industries had advertising-to-sale ratios of over 10%: beverages, perfume and
cosmetics, liquors, dolls and stuffed toys, motion pictures, and games and toys. Even in research-heavy
industries, such as pharmaceuticals, promotion outlays can be two to four times the budget for research
and development. See Mark A. Hurwitz & Richard A. Caves, Persuasion or Information? Promotion
and the Shares of BrandName and Generic Pharmaceuticals, 31 J.L. & ECON. 299, 302 (1988).
19 ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 44 (1999) ("[L]uxury goods .... cost real resources to
produce .... that we could have put to other uses."); Robert Pitofsky, Changing Focus in the Regula-
tion of Advertising, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY 125, 126 (Yale Brozen ed., 1974) ("The case for
direct regulation [of advertising] at bottom depends on the ability to draw a line between 'informative'
advertising .... and wholly 'persuasive' . . . .The argument that such [persuasive] efforts are socially..
. . wasteful is particularly compelling ...."); HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE
SOCIETY 71-72 (1948); see JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 125-30 (40th anni-
versary ed.1998) [hereinafter GALBRAITH, AFFLUENT SOCIETY]; JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE xxii, 303-05 (4th ed. 1985).
20 See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 115 (1956); GALBRAITH, AFFLUENT
SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 125-30.
21 JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 227 (2d ed. 1968); Hurwitz & Caves, supra note 18,
at 304 n.14.
22 See Becker & Murphy, supra note 13, at 955.
23 EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 126-27,
174 (8th ed. 1962); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 55 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1965) (1904) ("The end sought by the systematic advertising of the larger business concerns is
such a monopoly of custom and prestige. This form of monopoly is sometimes of great value, and is
frequently sold under the name of good-will, trademarks, brands etc.... The great end of consistent
advertising is to establish such differential monopolies resting on popular conviction."); Phillip Nelson,
The Economic Consequences of Advertising, 48 J. Bus. L. 213, 291 (1975) (citing William S. Comanor
& Thomas A. Wilson, Advertising Market Structure and Performance, 49 REV. ECON. & STAT. 423,
423 (1967)); see GALBRAITH, AFFLUENT SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 127 n.4; Hurwitz & Caves, supra
note 18, at 299-300.
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moral and that it enhances another social ill, materialism. Most notably,
however, proponents of this school of thought consider the consumer to be
irrational and gullible. They also make a clear distinction between "real," or
"physical," goods-the value of which they recognize-and illusionary or
"prestige" goods (actually "bads"), which they consider wasteful. The fol-
lowing excerpt is typical for this school of thought:
[B]uyer preferences for certain products are developed or shaped by the persuasive sales-
promotion activities of sellers, and particularly advertising .... [A]dvertising, and other
sales promotion may of course be primarily "informational" in its impact .... But in fact the
bulk of advertising is instead primarily "persuasive." It is aimed at creating product prefer-
ences thorough generally phrased praises of the attributes of various outputs .... Thus an
important category of product differentiation is built primarily on a non rational or emo-
tional basis, through the efforts of the "ad-man. ".... mhe possibility of developing sig-
nificant product differentiation through advertising. .. is greatly enhanced for so-called "gift
goods" or "prestige goods" ... and those that though not given away are similarly bought
with the motive of gaining the admiration or gratitude of others ....
Luxury goods and real goods, they argue, satisfy different needs.25
Most important are the "real" needs. These include food for the hungry,
clothing for the cold, and houses for the homeless.26 As a society becomes
more affluent, more "desires" are created. These lower-order needs are the
fruits of prodigal outlays and are psychologically, not physically,
grounded. 2' This approach has found a strong foothold among legal schol-
ars. 28 Professor Brown, for example, analogizes branding to a "black art"
24 BAIN, supra note 21, at 227 (emphasis added); see also CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 23, at 119-
20 ("[S]elling methods which play upon the buyer's susceptibilities, which use against him laws of
psychology .... against which he cannot defend himself, which frighten or flatter or disarm him-all of
these have nothing to do with his knowledge. They are not informative; they are manipulative."). For
Chamberlain, "the art of the advertiser is akin to that of the hypnotist" who wishes to gain control of the
buyer's consciousness. Id. at 133; see also Marshall McLuhan, Ads: Keeping Upset with the Joneses, in
ADVERTISING'S ROLE IN SOCIETY 5, 6 (John S. Wright & John E. Mertes eds., 1974) ("[Ads] are quite
in accord with the procedure of brain washing .... They are intended as subliminal pills for the subcon-
scious in order to exercise an hypnotic spell .... ).
25 See GALBRAITH, AFFLUENT SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 125-30; John Kenneth Galbraith, The
Management of Specific Demand, in ADVERTISING'S ROLE IN SOCIETY, supra note 24, at 135-36.
26 See GALBRAITH, AFFLUENT SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 115.
27 See GALBRAITH, AFFLUENT SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 127-29. See also Harry G. Johnson,
Apologia for Ad Men, in ADVERTISING'S ROLE IN SOCIETY, supra note 24, at 242-43. According to
Galbraith, even "the most retarded student in the nation's most primitive school of business administra-
tion" would recognize that "wants can be synthesized by advertising, catalyzed by salesmanship, and
shaped by the discreet manipulations of the persuaders."
28 See, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, Quality Standards, Informative Labeling, and Grade Labeling as
Guides to Consumer Buying, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 362, 362-64 (1949); Brown, supra note 15, at
1165-66; Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark Use, 19
GA. L. REV. 233, 23546 (1985); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the
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whose goal is to sell illusions to the irrational consumer.29 He concludes
that "the resources, measured in billions, going into persuasive advertising,
result only in a curtailed output of real goods.1 3 In his view, the law should
protect only informative advertising and should reject anti-dilution laws,
which he deems "the clearest, most candid, and most far-reaching claim on
behalf of persuasive values.'"'
B. The "Soft-Liners: " Branding Is Information
Another group of economic theorists views branding as a good be-
cause it conveys useful information about a product's attributes and qual-
ity.32 Soft-liners explain that if a consumer has had a bad experience with a
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PIr. L. REv. 789, 856-58 (1997) ("Where product
differentiation results from differences in the products' tangible characteristics .... informed consum-
ers rationally pay the premium. But where product differentiation 'is built primarily on a nonrational or
emotional basis, through the efforts of the 'ad-man," consumer willingness to pay the premium proves
economically inefficient."); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertis-
ing Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1717-18 (1999); Joseph M. Livermore, On Uses of a Competitor's
Trademark, 20 STAN. L. REV. 448, 449-50 (1968).
29 Brown, supra note 15, at 1165-66 ("I[T]he demands of modem advertising, a black art whose
practitioners are part of the larger army which employs threats, cajolery, emotions, personality, persis-
tence and facts in what is termed aggressive selling"). Professor Brown notes that advertising has two
main purposes: to inform and to persuade. Id. at 1183. To the extent that advertising provides consum-
ers with information, it has a social utility. Thus, "[iln a pure economy, advertising outlays (except for
information to make the market more nearly perfect) would only add to the costs, and decrease the
profit, of any firm." Id. at 1169-71.
30 Id. at 1179.
31 Id. at 1191. Of this critical view is also Klieger, who accuses dilution of protecting persuasive
values and artificial product differentiation that are "built primarily on a non-rational or emotional basis
...." Klieger, supra note 28, at 858 (citations omitted). See also LA RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMANN
ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 7:29, at 7-97 to -98 (Louis Altman ed.,
4th ed., West Group 2003) ("Although the independent value of the well-known trademark, its function
as a means of identifying the article ... and the economic value because of its irrational appeal were
duly noted by the Supreme Court, it is now clear that a famous trademark cannot be relied upon to
justify a price differential, if the products are not physically different." (footnotes omitted)). For a more
recent formulation of Brown's philosophy, see Litman, supra note 28, at 1718 ("Ralph [Brown]'s
analysis seems even more compelling, now that we have had a chance to see the world of advertising
grow in the intervening years." Strong trademark protection "would yield no benefits to consumers and
would disserve the public interest by shielding firms from healthy competition.").
32 See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) [herein-
after Consumer Behavior]; Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974);
Nelson, supra note 23, at 213 ("I find the hypothesis that advertising changes tastes intellectually unsat-
isfactory. We economists have no theory of taste changes, so this approach leads to no behavioral pre-
dictions. The intuitions of one group of economists are matched against the intuitions of other econo-
mists with no clear resolution."). See also George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est
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product, then an advertisement or a trademark will revive the bad experi-
ence in her memory and consequently lead to a decrease in consumption.33
The result is that only sellers with good products will find it profitable to
brand them. Under this view, branding serves as a screening mechanism
that signals to consumers which products are good and which are faulty.
The soft-liners, however, do not look beyond the physical product. They do
not believe that the branding serves a psychological role. To them, branding
has no value besides its ability to convey that the physical product it pro-
motes is a winner. Were perfect information otherwise abundant and cos-
tless, even they would agree that branding is wasteful.34
C. The "Middle-Liners: "A Rational Choice Approach
Occupying the ground between the hard-liners, who deplore the ef-
fects of persuasive branding, and the soft-liners, who view branding as a
means to communicate information about physical products, are the mid-
dle-liners, who take an intermediate approach. Middle-liners recognize the
informational value of branding but also pay attention to its psychological
effects.35 They argue that advertising adds new value to an existing physical
product.36 Consumers, therefore, are rational to consider branding in mak-
ing their purchasing decisions. As Demsetz explained:
Pork to a religious Moslem hardly offers the same value that it does to a Christian. Nothing
is intrinsic about the values of the commodities and services. Their worth depends on how
we perceive them .... Underlying the idea that commodities have intrinsic value is the be-
Disputandum 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977). But see Ronald H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (1977). After quoting Nelson on changing tastes, Professor Coase noted that he
"would have thought that the belief that advertising had some effect on tastes .... was shared by every-
one who is willing to agree that tastes can change. No doubt Professor Nelson is correct when he says
that we do not have a theory of tastes. But ignorance about a subject seems an inadequate reason for
not studying it." Id. (emphasis added). Only three years after Nelson's article, Dixit and Norman devel-
oped a controversial framework to analyze changes in taste due to persuasive advertising. Avinash Dixit
& Victor Norman, Advertising and Welfare, 9 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1978).
33 This analysis applies to products characterized by repeat purchasers and experience qualities
(i.e., qualities that consumers learn by experience, such as the taste of canned tuna).
34 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992) ("Under conditions of
perfect competition, there is no advertising because consumers are assumed to be endowed at the outset
with perfect information and thus have no need for it."); Brown, supra note 15, at 1170.
35 See, e.g., Theodore Levitt, Advertising and its Adversaries, in ADVERTISING'S ROLE IN
SOCIETY, supra note 24, at 248 (noting that "[c]ivilization is a man's attempt to transcend his ancient
animality; and this includes both art and advertising.").
36 See Harold Demsetz, Advertising in The Affluent Society, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY, supra
note 19, at 67, 75.
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lief that we are motivated by basic, stable, and simple wants. If man ever was so motivated,
that time has long since passed.
37
To sum, many theorists have tried to provide an explanation of the
value or lack of value associated with branding and persuasive advertising;
yet none of the theories developed to date provides an explanation that sys-
tematizes the judicial decisions. The remainder of this article attempts to do
just that. Building on the views of the middle-liners, it seeks to demonstrate
that persuasive branding indeed adds value to the physical product. As
shown in the next part, in a modem society even the most basic goods such
as flour, gas, lumber, and meat have more than the tangible qualities that
the eyes meet or the hands feel.
II. TRADEMARK & TRADE-NAME LAWS: PROTECTING SNOBS
Trademark and trade-name law's approach to persuasive branding is
inconsistent. It suffers from a hard-line-soft-line schizophrenia. It adopts a
"hard-line" premise: snobs are irrational and branding exploits their suscep-
tibilities. But instead of fighting what it perceives to be anticompetitive
behavior (as the hard-liners do), it adopts a "soft-line" solution, protecting
famous marks, and thereby snobbism, thus allowing sellers of branded
products to charge higher prices than those for identical non-branded
goods.
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court fully embraced the hard-liners'
view that consumers are often irrational in their purchasing decisions. Per-
suasive branding, wrote Justice Harlan, may "undeniably ...be used to
create irrational brand preferences and to mislead consumers as to the ac-
tual differences between products . . . ."' Its object is "to impregnate the
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol,"
37 Id. Demsetz's theory that commodities are basic building blocks whose value is determined by
consumers' perception was modeled by Stigler and Becker. See Stigler & Becker, supra note 32, at 77.
Stigler and Becker propose a new theory of consumers' choice. Id. Unlike the traditional theory in
which consumers maximize their utility function directly from the goods purchased, in their
reformulation consumers maximize utility from commodities they produce with goods, their own time,
skills, and other inputs such as advertising. Id. To illustrate, consider the utility a consumer receives
from playing tennis. The game itself is the "commodity" that enters the utility function. The racquet,
balls, and their brand names are just inputs. The consumer does not buy them to own them because she
derives no utility from the goods themselves. They are used to "manufacture" the game. See id; see also
Len M. Nichols, Advertising and Economics Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 213 (1985). Unlike Stigler
and Becker, this author perceives trademarks not as inputs but as parts of an intangible end-product that
directly enters the consumer utility function.
38 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603 (1967).
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rather than to communicate information as to quality or price.39 Trademarks
were even accused of possessing Pavlovian capabilities, creating a "condi-
tioned reflex" in buyers' minds." It was held that, to the extent that persua-
sive branding succeeds,
economically irrational elements are introduced into consumer choices; and the trademark
[or trade-name] owner is insulated from the normal pressures of price and quality competi-
tion. In consequence the competitive system fails to perform its function of allocating avail-
able resources efficiently .... Moreover, the economically irrelevant appeal of highly publi-
cized trademarks is thought to constitute a barrier to the entry of new competition into the
market .... In some markets this barrier to entry may be insuperable.
4
1
The judicial approach suffers from schizophrenia because, rather than
fighting what it claims to be artificial product differentiation, misallocation
of resources, and social waste, it protects consumers' capricious decisions
and helps to maintain consumers' perception that branded and non-branded
products differ.
As early as 1933, the Supreme Court held that "if consumers or deal-
ers prefer to purchase a given article because it was made by a particular
manufacturer... they have a right to do so, and this right cannot be satis-
fied by imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one equally as
good ... ."' In Royal Milling Company, the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") enjoined defendants' use of the words "Mill" or "Milling" in their
trade names because such use was misleading for sellers, not grinders, of
flour.43 On appeal, both the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the consuming public possessed an unfounded belief that flour
bought directly from grinders is superior to that sold by the defendants."
Yet the courts differed in their willingness to protect consumers in their
"irrational belief." The court of appeals focused on the product's physical
characteristics.45 The two types of flour (those made by grinders and those
mixed and sold by the defendants), it said, were of the same quality, were
made under the same process with the same machinery, and were therefore
39 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
40 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d at 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968).
41 id.
42 FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216 (1933).
43 Id. at 214.
44 Royal Milling Co. v. FTC, 58 F.2d 581, 583 (6th Cir. 1932) ("It is not shown that the petition-
ers' product is injurious to the consumer, or that it is in any way different from or inferior to the product
of their competitors."); Royal Milling, 288 U.S. at 216 ("If consumers or dealers prefer to purchase a
given article because it was made by a particular manufacturer or class of manufacturers, they have a
right to do so, and this right cannot be satisfied by imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one
equally as good, but having a different origin.").
45 Royal Milling, 58 F.2d at 582-83.
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identical.46 This led the court of appeals to the conclusion that there was no
public injury or financial loss, and so it set aside the FTC's orders. 47 For the
court of appeals, the public had received exactly what it had sought to re-
ceive.48 The fact that the public wanted flour sold directly by grinders, be-
lieving it to be different from the defendants' flour, was of no consequence.
Indeed, on its face, the public seems to be better off without the "Mill" dis-
tinction because it would receive the same flour at a cheaper price.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.49 It held that because
consumers believed that flour sold by grinders was of superior quality, de-
fendants' use of the word "Milling" caused consumers to be "deceived into
purchasing an article which they do not wish or intend to buy . . . -50 it
found deception even though the consumer received the same physical
product they intended to buy. 1 In this, the Supreme Court broadened the
law of unfair competition to protect consumers against deceit with regard to
a product's psychological value. It protected consumers' perceptions, even
if emotionally-based, irrational, or unfounded.
Less than a year later, a similar case gave the Supreme Court an op-
portunity to reaffirm the jurisprudence of Royal Milling.52 In Algoma Lum-
ber, the FTC issued a cease and desist order against lumber suppliers who
marketed as "California White Pine" lumber that was biologically "Yellow
Pine."53 While aware of Royal Milling, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless an-
nulled the order, explaining that the two types of woods were "so nearly
equal in utility that buyers [were] not injured, even though misled.
54
Again, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the two types of
lumber were equivalent, consumers are nevertheless prejudiced "if upon
giving an order for one thing, [they are] supplied with something else."55 In
such matters, "the public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the
choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance."56
46 Id. at 583.
47 id.
48 Id. ("[T]he record fails wholly to establish any injury to the public or any loss suffered by it,
either individually or in the aggregate. It is not shown that the petitioners' product is injurious to the
consumer, or that it is in any way different from or inferior to the product of their competitors.").
49 Royal Milling, 288 U.S. at 218.
50 Id. at 217.
51 Id. at 216-17.
52 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
53 Algoma Lumber Co. v. FTC, 64 F.2d 618, 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1933).
54 See Algoma Lumber, 291 U.S. at 74 (summarizing the Ninth Circuit point of view).
55 Id. at 78.
56 The law of trademark and unfair competition recognizes the psychological effect of branding
on consumers:
The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of sym-
bols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A
[VOL. 14:3
FAMOUS TRADEMARKS AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS
With the law thus clarified, the circuit courts followed Royal Milling.
In Benton Announcements, Inc. the FTC ordered a printer to cease describ-
ing its stationary as "engraved. 5 7 On appeal, the Second Circuit found that
the printer's printing process was much cheaper than engraving and that
only experts could distinguish between engraving and the petitioner's sta-
tionery. 8 Nevertheless, the court held that "people like to get what they
think they are getting, and courts have steadfastly refused in this class of
cases to demand justification for their preferences. Shoddy and petty mo-
tives may control those preferences; but if the buyers wish to be snobs, the
law will protect them in their snobbery."59
Similarly, in Kerran v. FTC, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the FTC's or-
der enjoining sellers of recycled oil from marketing the oil without disclos-
ing its source.6" Despite finding that re-refined oil is absolutely identical to
"virgin" oil in chemical structure and quality, the court held that because
consumers prefer new to used oil, the sellers' practice misled consumers.6"
"The public is entitled to know the facts ... and then make its own choice.
• .even though the choice is predicated at least in part upon ill-founded
sentiment, belief, or caprice."62
The court did not say why consumers' "irrational" beliefs should be
protected. Nor did it find that consumers would be better off if protected in
their snobbery. By its reasoning, the opposite is true. Courts have empha-
sized that persuasive branding fosters the differentiation of physically iden-
tical products by creating an aura that enables producers to command
higher prices than they would have been able to command had they faced
trademark is a merchandising shortcut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or
what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propen-
sity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to con-
vey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark owner has something of value. If
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner
can obtain legal redress.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
57 Benton Announcements, Inc. v. FTC, 130 F.2d 254, 254 (2d Cir. 1942).
58 Id. at 255.
59 Id.
60 Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246, 248 (10th Cir. 1959).
61 Id.
62 Id.; see also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 389 (1965) ("In each [case] the
seller has used a misrepresentation to break down what he regards to be an annoying or irrational habit
of the buying public-the preference for particular manufacturers or known brands regardless of a
product's actual qualities, the prejudice against reprocessed goods, and the desire for verification of a
product claim. In each case the seller reasons that when the habit is broken the buyer will be satisfied
with the performance of the product he receives.").
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the full burden of competition.63 Consumers are on its face worse off be-
cause they pay more for products that they could have purchased for much
less. The language of these decisions leads to an inescapable conclusion: If
instead of protecting consumers' "irrational beliefs," courts would impose
on them the same item,'M consumers would purchase the same physical
flour, lumber, engravings, or gas at a lower price.
Judge Frank of the Second Circuit took a different approach to the is-
sue in Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd.65 Judge Frank agreed
with the Supreme Court's view that snobbery should be protected.' 6 But
unlike the Supreme Court, he explained that the purpose is to protect pro-
ducers, not consumers. The sole purpose of trade-name law, he stated, is to
protect producers against those who wish to free ride on their goodwill.67
Under this view, although consumers are undoubtedly worse-off due to
trade-name law, an analysis comparing the cost to consumers and the bene-
fit to producers mandates that the latter receive protection:"5
Such statements [that trade name law is aimed to protect consumers] the judges did not ver-
ify .... They did not stop to ask whether there was any conflict between the objective of(a)
aiding consumers and (b) that of preventing loss to the businessman who first used the trade-
name. They failed to see that the doctrine of so-called "unfair competition" is really a doc-
trine of "unfair intrusion on a monopoly." Had they done so, they would squarely have faced
the question of the value to consumers of such a judge-made monopoly. But reiteration of
the consumer-benefit argument was bound, sooner or later, to evoke doubts such as this: If
63 See, e.g., Algoma Lumber Co. v. FTC, 64 F.2d 618, 623 (9th Cir. 1933); Smith v. Chanel, Inc.,
402 F.2d at 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The primary value of the modem trademark lies in the 'condi-
tioned reflex developed in the buyer by imaginative or often purely monotonous selling of the mark
itself.'.... [Elconomically irrational elements are introduced into consumer choices; and the trademark
owner is insulated from the normal pressures of price and quality competition. In consequence, the
competitive system fails to perform its function of allocating available resources efficiently.") (citation
omitted).
64 Courts could do this, for example, by allowing sellers to use certain misdescriptive terms in
their trade-names (e.g., "Mill" for a seller who is not a grinder) or by compelling certain sellers to
license to others the right to use a mark.
65 See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1945); E. Wine Corp. v. Win-
slow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943).
66 See Standard Brands, 151 F.2d at 41 n.13; E. Wine, 137 F.2d at 958 ("There appears to be a
related judicial policy of protecting snobbism.").
67 See Standard Brands, 151 F.2d at 41; E. Wine, 137 F.2d at 958 ("The protection of such mo-
nopolies in names seems, then, to rest on the social interest in protecting primarily, not the consumer,
but the businessman who has gained a strategic advantage, through building up of good-will," against
the unfair practices by competitors who profit on that good-will.).
68 Judge Frank noted that while courts have adopted a liberal view that the economic well-being
of consumers is the paramount goal of any economic activity, "legal principles do not swell i la Robin-
son Crusoe or in an anarchic state of nature." E. Wine, 137 F.2d at 958. The law, he explained, often
creates immunities from competition (i.e., monopolies); trade-name law, to Judge Frank, creates mo-
nopolies to protect producers, not consumers. Id. at 957-58.
[VOL. 14:3
FAMOUS TRADEMARKS AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS
Alert & Co. sells a laundry soap, under the name "Quick Clean," at 75 cents a cake, and a
competitor, Wiseacre, Inc., then begins to sell the identical soap under the same name at 50
cents a cake, Alert & Co. loses customers, and therefore money, if it maintains its price; but
the purchasers are misled to their financial benefit. If the sole purpose were to protect con-
sumers from direct financial loss, the second name-user in such a case would have a com-
plete defense if he showed that he sold, at a lower price, precisely the same article (com-
pounded of exactly the same ingredients) as the first user.
69
In Judge Frank's view, trade-name law seeks to protect producers so
that they can reap what they have sown. This property-patent rationale,
however, contrasts with the long-standing view that the essence of both
trademark infringement and unfair competition law is to avoid consumer
confusion and that "protection of trademark is merely a facet of consumer
protection."70 Moreover, Judge Frank's explanation fails to explain the
cases that gave birth to the Supreme Court's policy of "protecting consum-
ers in their irrational beliefs." If the major rationale is to protect a senior
competitor from a junior that free-rides on its name, it fails to explain why
the Supreme Court did not allow producers to use names that are in the
public domain. "Milling" in Royal Milling, "White Pine" in Algona Lum-
ber and "Engraved" in Benton are all generic names, permanent residents of
the public domain. Had the Supreme Court allowed sellers of flour to use
"Milling" in their trade names, no competitor would have suffered a dimi-
nution in his investment. Rather, their marks would continue to serve their
traditional function: identifying the product's source.7 Consumers, on the
other hand, would have enjoyed lower prices and increased welfare.
III. RE-EVALUATING THE ROLE OF PERSUASIVE BRANDING
This Part offers a new economic rationale for protecting snobs. It chal-
lenges the institutions' approach conclusion that consumers are irrational
and argues that snobbery is a desirable, welfare-enhancing phenomenon
that inures to the benefit of both consumers and producers. It does so by
offering a more complex view of the role of trademarks.
69 Standard Brands, 151 F.2d at 40-41 (emphasis added).
70 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COPETITION § 2:33 at
2-58 (4th ed. 2002); see also Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M&M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 136
(2d Cir. 2003).
71 "Royal Mill," for example, denotes a specific mill.
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A. Looking Beyond the Tangible Product
Prior formulations of the economic role of trademarks assumed that
their role is limited to conveying information about the physical product to
which they are affixed, thereby reducing consumers' search costs." Trade-
marks serve this role by signifying a specific source of manufacture (or
sale). Because they denote a constant source, a consumer who wishes to
purchase a product she bought in the past does not need to conduct a costly
search; she need not investigate the substitutes available in the marketplace,
remember the product's materials, composition, etc. The mark or the trade-
name tells her: "I am the one you want." The mark also provides her with
the assurance that the product's physical attributes are the same as when
she last purchased the product.
But viewing trademarks as only a means of communicating informa-
tion about the product to which they are attached is naive. Trademarks may,
because of a mark's popularity, be an important attribute of the product
itself, just like a color, taste, smell, or design. A trademark may even be-
come the product itself. To illustrate, assume that the insignia used by Mer-
cedes-Benz to identify its cars has become so popular that consumers are
willing to don the Mercedes emblem as earrings, key-holders, etc. Such use
is a non-trademark use. The mark has become a good of its own. In its new
incarnation, the mark is emancipated from the physical product to which it
previously had been attached. This new type of product (e.g., earrings)
may be manufactured by different tradesmen, each of which may use a
trademark to identify itself as a source.
Trademark law is not indifferent to the possibility that a mark may
gain such intrinsic value that its "trademark function" may be shaded or
even altogether eliminated. The law holds that where a mark is divested of
its "trademark value," it is "functional" (or "aesthetically functional") and
denies it protection. In the case of International Order of Job's Daughters
v. Lindeburg, for example, the defendant sold jewelry and related items
bearing the insignias of the Job's Daughters, which were protected as "col-
72 For a thorough analysis of the role of trademark, see WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166 (2003); Shahar J. Dilbary, Trade-
marks, Mega Brands and False Advertising in Intra-Brand Settings: An Economics Analysis, Doctorate
Dissertation (to be submitted and published in June 2007 by the UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO); see
also infra note 160.
73 Of course, there may exist a complementary relationship between the new product (the emanci-
pated mark) and the original goods to which that mark was (and may still be) affixed. For example, if
Mercedes-Benz became associated with low quality cars, that would affect the demand for Mercedes-
logo earrings. In this case, the earrings and Mercedes may be analyzed as complementary goods.
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lective marks. ' 74 Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant's use of the
emblems was not actionable because they were functionally aesthetic com-
ponents of the jewelry. 75 The insignias were copied and sold "on the basis
of their intrinsic value, not as a designation of origin or sponsorship.
76
Between the two extreme cases-those in which a trademark has a
purely informational role (signifying a source of manufacture or sale) and
those in which it becomes reincarnated as a product in its own right-lie
cases of a third type. In these cases, a trademark retains its source-
identifying function but is also an independent good. It increases consumer
welfare by decreasing consumers' informational costs and also provides
them with additional utility independent of the parent product.
At least one court, however, was not willing to extend protection in
this kind of case. Pagliero v. Wallace China introduced a demand-based
analysis, 77 focusing on whether the mark enhances demand for the physical
product.78 If so, the mark is "functional" and is not protected. But if the
mark's impact is limited to imparting information about the goods to which
it is affixed-that is, "adopted for purposes of identification... and hence,
unrelated to basic consumer demands in connection with the product"--it is
eligible for protection. 79 The test is similar to Professor Brown's proposal to
disaggregate the informational "threads" of advertising from the persuasive
ones.
The Pagliero court's demand test is inappropriate. A mark, while
keeping its "trademark function" as an identifier, may nevertheless legiti-
mately enhance consumer demand."° Indeed, an individual might buy a
74 Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg, 633 F.2d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1980). A collective
mark is a trademark "used by the members of a cooperative, an association or other collective group or
organization... and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an association or other organiza-
tion." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
75 Lindeburg, 633 F.2d at 917.
76 Id. at 918.
77 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952). Pagliero's so-called
"aesthetic functionality test," under which trademark protection is barred from a design whose aesthetic
appeal is "an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product," has been limited (albeit
not explicitly rejected) by subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc.,
644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981).
78 Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343.
79 Id.
80 Id. The court's reliance on a demand-based test is misplaced for two additional reasons. First,
even where the sole function of a mark is to impart information, it impacts consumer demand. See infra
Part IV. Second, the doctrine of functionality calls for a supply-based analysis because functionality is
often equated with an increase of producers' marginal costs. See, e.g., W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778
F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding "a functional feature is one which competitors would have to
spend money not to copy but to design around, as they would have to do if they wanted to come up with
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product not only because of the product's physical attributes but also be-
cause of the insignia or the trade-name that identifies its manufacturer. This
combined purpose of the trademark may explain individuals' willingness to
pay more for goods that bear famous marks or trade-names than for goods
of identical or even of higher quality. "Armani," for example, has an inde-
pendent value. It informs the public of the owner's refined taste, status, and
income. It conveys an "image" or a "look" that is annexed to the physical
garment. Similarly, individuals are willing to pay "exorbitant" prices for
cars manufactured by Ferrari or Lamborghini not only because of the cars'
unique physical properties but also because of the status that they confer. A
Ferrari, unlike an identical vehicle that lacks the Ferrari mark, is able to
function as a car while signaling the owner's wealth, taste, and hedonism.
Note that I do not use the word "signal" in its usual sense. The signal-
ing function of persuasive advertising is not limited to educating consumers
about the properties of the tangible product. Rather, it educates others about
the owner's taste, beliefs, and stature. Moreover, trademarks and persuasive
advertising sometimes do not serve any signaling purpose; instead, they are
limited to providing psychological pleasure and private satisfaction. Con-
sumers are often willing to pay high prices for inconspicuous goods, such
as Calvin Klein underwear or a L'Ordal body lotion, neither of which is
usually visible to others. They do so because they derive some private
benefit from this inconspicuous consumption. To use the slogan coined by
L'Oreal, consumers buy the company's products "because [they're] worth
it." 1 Similarly, a product can be both a signal of status and a source of sat-
isfaction. Hanging a Picasso in the living room is a signal of status for the
socialite, but what value does it have for the loner who enjoys only the fact
of owning such a piece if not private emotional catharsis?82
Specifically, three inseparable demands reside within a branded prod-
uct. The first is a demand for the product itself: the physical and functional
attributes of a suit, a perfume, a salad dressing. The consumer derives a
mundane utility from a suit that protects her from the cold, the scent of per-
fume, and the taste and nutritional value of salad dressing. The second kind
of demand is for intra-brand information83 about the product's credence
a non-oval substitute for a football."). Judge Posner's rationale is that protecting a functional feature
will raise rivals' costs which, in turn, will impact supply rather than consumer demand. Id
81 See L'Ordal from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L'OrC3%A9al (last visited Feb. 5,
2007). L'Ordal's famous advertising slogan--"Because I'm worth it"--- was recently replaced with
"Because you're worth it" and more lately "You're worth it." Id.
82 For another example of consumers purchasing name-brand products for personal satisfaction
rather than for any quality improvements see infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
83 On the distinction between inter-brand and intra-brand activities, see infra note 222.
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qualities.8 4 Was the suit handmade, and is it cashmere or wool? 5 Was the
perfume produced according to a "secret formula"?86 How many calories
are in the salad dressing?87 Is the product reliable and likely to perform well
in the future? As shown in Part IV, the information conveyed by the mark
leads to the optimal level of consumption of the physical good. The third
demand is for the image or psychological pleasure associated with the
mark's fame. The consumer enjoys owning a new product; basking in the
intangible aura that surrounds the physical good; and feeling wealthy and
affluent, spontaneous, cool, or cosmopolitan. Put differently, the trademark
does not act to increase sales only by economizing on consumers' search
costs or by minimizing consumers' error costs. Rather, it also influences
demand for the product itself and increases sales.
The three demands are regularly commingled. While it is intuitive that
consumers seek a bundle containing both the product and pertinent infor-
mation on that product's credence qualities, it is less obvious why a con-
sumer might be interested in tying her demand for an image or a psycho-
logical freight to a physical product. The reason is that social norms and
technological constraints often prevent consumption of the intangible asset
apart from a physical one. Indeed, one cannot enter the local supermarket
and ask for five units of "prestige," "status," or "pleasure."8 There are very
few exceptions to this observation. One is the market for titles of nobility.
Unlike feudal times, when titles conferred upon their bearers substantial
rights (such as voting rights, rights to land, and tax revenue), titles today
are primarily a matter of status. Sellers of titles promise their clients "in-
84 The economic literature distinguishes between three types of attributes: experience qualities can
be verified pre-purchase (e.g., the color of a tomato); experience qualities can be verified post-purchase
(e.g., the taste of canned tuna); and credence qualities cannot be easily verified even post-purchase (e.g.,
the effects of vitamins). See Michael R. Darby & Edi Kami, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount
of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973); Nelson, Consumer Behavior, supra note 32, at 317.
85 For cases dealing with products' intra-brand information, see Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327
U.S. 608, 609-10 (1946); Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1959).
86 For a case discussing the trademark of a product made using a secret recipe, see Mulhens &
Kropff, Inc. v. Fred Muelhens, Inc., 38 F.2d 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), rev'd, 43 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1930).
87 For an empirical study, see Allan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on
Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 655 (2000). For an
analysis of the survey in an intra-brand context, see Dilbary, supra note 72.
88 See Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, With Particular
Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1069, 1070 (1999) ("'Status' has been a concern
primarily of sociologists, anthropologists, and historians rather than of economists; and though there is a
growing economic literature on the subject, status is still widely considered a non-economic phenome-
non because it cannot be purchased or traded. . . . Although one can invest in activities that will raise
one's status, for example by publicly donating to charity, or indeed just by flaunting one's wealth, one
cannot buy status directly as one can the usual good or service.") (citation omitted).
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stant credibility and personal prestige,"89 that they will be "treated like
some sort of Royalty or famous film star."9 Many websites sell titles such
as Sir, Lord, Baron, Count, Viscount, Marquis and Duke.9' For the small
amount of $325 one may even become a Prince, an Emperor or a Sultan.
The envied nobility status can be achieved in as little time as fourteen days,
and its holder can change her driver's license, passport, credit cards and
bank accounts to reflect her new status. Seated Titles-that is, titles that are
accompanied by the name of a locality, (e.g., "The Lord of Hyde Park")
considered to be far more prestigious-are valued primarily for their signal-
ing function. The owner of a Seated Title actually buys a parcel of land in
addition to the title itself. Yet, as the title sellers note, "it is the titles them-
selves that are of significance here with the land itself being of no great
importance per se it being but a token area" (the size of the land is usually
no more than one square foot).92
Social norms are another reason that a physical product must serve as
a platform for intangible psychological freight.93 Consider, for example, the
person who wishes to inform the public of her wealth. If she does so explic-
itly, she will suffer the stigma of being arrogant and a braggart. Moreover,
her signal would not be credible: If one could enjoy the social benefits of
wealth, prestige, or refined taste simply by praising oneself, many would do
so. Consequently, a pooling equilibrium would occur, and the public would
be unable to distinguish the truly wealthy or hip from those who merely
claim to be. It would be impossible to distinguish those who tell the truth
from those who do not. The wealthy consumer (the snob) can achieve the
89 English Feudal Titles, http://www.englishtitles.co.uk (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
90 English Titles for Sale, http://www.matthewhenson.com/sorebritishlosers/sorebrits8.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2007). Sellers tout their titles' effects on prestige and psychological self-worth:
By acquiring and using a Title [customers] might well find [themselves] treated very differ-
ently by the people with whom [they] come into contact in all aspects of social and commer-
cial interaction.... Whether on board an aircraft or aboard ship or indeed when simply stay-
ing in a hotel anywhere in the word, with a title in front of your name, [they] may find that
[they] receive a better class and quality of service.... [A] Title may help to enhance the im-
age and profile of [their] company in a very cost effective way. Many of [their] clients, or
indeed, potential clients, will undoubtedly be impressed by a titled company owner or board
member.
English Feudal Titles, supra note 89.
91 See, e.g., Elite Titles, http://www.elite-titles.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2007); English Feudal
Titles, supra note 89; English Titles, http://www.english-titles.co.uk/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2007); The
Freebooter, http://www.freebooter.com/titles-of-nobility.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). For a critical
view of the title market, see The Earl of Bradford, Beware Buying British Titles on the Intemet (2002),
http://www.burkes-peerage.net/sites/common/sitepages/ft0l.asp; The Earl of Bradford, Fake Titles,
http://www.faketitles.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
92 EnglishTitles.co.uk, Seated Title, http://www.englishtitles.co.uk (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
93 The physical platform is often necessary for the consumption of the psychological product.
Watching a horror movie, visiting an amusement park, or even consuming drugs are a few of the more
direct ways to produce an emotional thrill but still cannot be separated from physical consumption.
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desired effect, however, by wearing a conspicuous garment that transmits
the same message. Burberry's famous trade dress or a Cartier watch could
suffice. Being visible to the public, such products function not only as
clothing or timekeepers but they also provide information about their
owner. The same message that would be taken as arrogance if conveyed
directly becomes style when conveyed indirectly. The signal is credible if
only those of wealth can afford to purchase such products.
Even in the case of inconspicuous goods, the psychological freight of
which is a pleasant feeling received from an undergarment or invisible
cosmetic, the consumer has to buy the branded product. If she buys a
physically identical product with an unknown brand, she will not be able to
achieve the same level of private satisfaction. The consumer who wishes to
reward herself with a new Cartier watch or L'Oreal lotion would not be
able to mimic the feeling by buying a knockoff watch (even if no one but
her would know the difference) or a generic lotion. She would not enjoy the
feeling of owning unique or luxurious goods unless she buys the original
product (and pays the fame premium).
Similarly, a work of art may carry the same signaling or pleasuring ef-
fect. For this very reason, consumers purchase both replicas and original
paintings. Replicas provide decor. Originals provide decor and create the
image of high socio-economic status.94 Psychological freight can also ex-
plain why the price of a painting attributed to a famous painter plummets
dramatically when it is discovered to be a forgery. Those who were willing
to pay the high premium for the image of snobbery created by a genuine
Picasso would not be willing to pay the same amount for same painting if it
were attributed to an unknown painter.95 That consumption of intangible
psychic goods is not limited to irrational individuals is demonstrated by the
fact that even museums call attention to the monetary value of their collec-
tions. They do so either explicitly or by calling attention to a work by the
way it is exhibited.96 Grampp notes that one such method is to loop a velvet
94 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. GRAMPP, PRICING THE PRICELESS: ART, ARTISTS AND ECONOMI1CS 35-
36(1989).
95 See id. at 38. Grampp reports that when "[t]he Museum of Fine Arts in Dahlem, West Berlin,
learned that the portrait of The Man With The Golden Helmet was not by Rembrandt as had been
thought" and the Metropolitan in New York reached a similar conclusion with regards to two other
paintings said to be by the famous artist (Pilate Washing His Hands and Woman Paring Her Nails),
their "money value" decreased. Id. at 23. But see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 72, at 255-56. The
scarcity of the original, as opposed to the widespread availability of copies, cannot fully explain the
price differential. After all, copies and originals are often perfect physical substitutes: they are of the
same grade and quality (to use the words of the Robinson-Patman Act), save the intangible property
associated with the original.
96 Robert Hughes, Harold Rosenberg Memorial Lecture at the University of Chicago: Art and
Money (May 13, 1984), available at http://members.shaw.ca/competitivenessofnations/Anno%20Hughe
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cord in front of a prized acquisition, as the Metropolitan Museum did in
1961 when it hung Rembrandt's Aristotle Contemplating a Bust of Homer,
which was acquired at a record price of $2.3 million.97 Another method is to
post a guard nearby even when her presence is not necessary for the piece's
protection.9"
A more intriguing example is that of vintage photos. While the origi-
nal and a copy made from the same negative are identical in most physical
aspects (in fact, a copy made from the same negative may be of better qual-
ity as the original suffers from wear and tear), the price of the original can
be significantly higher. Professors Landes and Posner report that the "Mi-
grant Mother"--Dorothea Lange's widely reproduced vintage photo-
graph-was sold at Sotheby's on October 7, 1998 for $244,500. 9 An exhi-
bition-quality print could have been obtained for $50 from the Library of
Congress."° Consumers are willing to pay more for what they could pur-
chase for less, not because they are irrational (or for want of information),
but because they purchase more than a photograph.
Other possible explanations may account for consumers' willingness
to pay for original artwork. I will focus briefly on two. The first explanation
is supply and demand. Because the supply of originals of an artwork is very
limited (often only one) whereas the supply for copies is very high, the
price for the original should be higher, the argument goes. But this rationale
assumes that the market for the original and the market for its copies are
different product markets, without explaining why. The contrary assump-
tion-that the original and its copies are perfect substitutes-is more ap-
pealing, because the two products are physically identical. The article ar-
gues that an original is truly different from a copy because the original car-
ries a psychological freight that a copy does not.
The second alternative explanation is investment: consumers are will-
ing to pay more for the original because they know that they can sell it to
others at the same or a higher price in the future. This is flawed for two
reasons. First, art is a poor investment because art prices are subject to the
volatile and ever-changing fashions and fads. Artwork is also unique and so
illiquid. Other markets are more easily employed for investment purposes,
offering similar or better rates of return at a much lower risk."' The main
s%20Art%20&%20Money.htm; GRAMPP, supra note 94, at 25.
97 GRAMPP, supra note 94, at 25.
98 id.
99 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 72, at 256 n.5; William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Im-
ages and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 5-6 n.17 (2000).
100 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 72, at 256 n.5.
101 But see William M. Landes, Winning The Art Lottery: The Economic Returns to The Ganz
Collection, 66 LouvAiN ECON. REV. 111, 111-30 (2000). Professor Landes reports that the Ganz collec-
tion sold in 1997 for $207 million was purchased (between 1941-1991) for about $2 million in 1997
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flaw, however, lies in the assumption that one can purchase a piece of art as
an investment only because others are willing to pay more for it. This
statement begs the question as to why others would be willing to do so. The
answer is that enough consumers are willing to pay a high premium for the
intangible value which piggybacks on the original to sustain such a market.
Over-the-counter generic and branded drugs are another example.
Though generics can offer equal therapeutic value and drug quality and are
monitored by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"),"2 many con-
sumers nevertheless prefer to pay more for branded drugs. Surveys show
that generic drugs could save consumers hundred of million of dollars
every year."0 3 For the hard-liners, this is clear proof of the wasteful nature
of branding and evidence of consumers' irrational behavior. Soft-liners
would attack the assumption of therapeutic equivalence, arguing that
branded drugs convey the information that the physical product to which
the mark is affixed is of better quality and so commands a higher price. But
they would admit that if the assumption of therapeutic equivalence holds,
such advertising is wasteful. The soft-liner's explanation also fails to ex-
plain the large advertising outlays on pharmaceuticals, which appear to be
much higher than necessary to merely convey information to consumers."°
Consumers of branded drugs are rational, because they are buying not
only a drug or information about the drug, but also a feeling. They purchase
Bayer Aspirin for the same reason they purchase L'Oreal lipstick: because
"they're worth it." They receive their peace of mind not only by taking the
pain reliever but also from knowing that it was made by Bayer. Moreover,
many times a placebo (a tablet that contains no medication) has medical
dollars. Id. at 111. He concludes that Ganz's investment in art "beat--often by a wide margin-the
returns from common stocks." Id. at 117. Equivalent investment in stocks would have been yielded
between $47 million and $133 million, compared to the $184 million profits from the Ganz's 1997 sale.
Id. at 115.
102 See William 0. Bearden & J. Barry Mason, Determinants of Physician and Pharmacist Support
of Generic Drugs, 7 J. CONSUMER RES. 121, 121-22 (1980). The authors argue that there may be real
differences between generic drugs and their brand name equivalents. Chemical equivalency does not
necessarily promise therapeutic equivalency because of factors such as "varying packing density, crys-
talline form of active ingredients, and biological text of inactive fillers and binders." Id. at 122. Also,
some surveys suggest that the FDA is less efficient at monitoring small firms, which are the ones most
likely to produce generic drugs. David W. Fisher, Editorial, Generic Chaos, HosP. PRACTICE, June
1978, at 13, 18.
103 Bearden & Mason, supra note 102, at 122 (citing a Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare report that projects that the use of generic drugs could save consumers in excess of $400 mil-
lions annually).
104 See, e.g., Hurwitz & Caves, supra note 18, at 302 (noting that in the drug industry, where
research and development budgets are relatively large, promotional budgets can be two to four times
larger).
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effects for purely psychological reasons. 05 An advertisement that con-
stantly harps that a branded drug will make you stronger, healthier, or more
sexually active may well cause the drug to perform better than a physically
identical drug bearing a different mark or no mark at all.'06
B. Anti-Dilution
1. Trademark Infringement and Dilution
Trademark dilution is not only a newcomer to the federal arena,1"7 it is
also an exception to the general rule. The mainline of trademark analysis is
consumer confusion. Traditional trademark infringement occurs when a
producer passes his product as another's, thereby confusing consumers. The
law protects consumers so that they can be confident that in purchasing a
product bearing a particular trademark they will get that particular product.
The law also protects producers from a diversion of trade on non-
meritorious grounds.0 8 Although trademark law is designed to protect both
consumers and producers, a private cause of action is only available to the
trademark owner (in the case of trademark infringement) and to competitors
105 See, e.g., MELMON AND MORRELLI'S CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY: BASIC PRINCIPLES IN
THERAPEUTICS 1268-69 (S. George Carruthers, M.D. et al., eds., 4th ed. 2000); Bruce E. Wampold,
Takuya Minami, Sandra C. Tiemey, et al. The Placebo Is Powerful: Estimating Placebo Effects in
Medicine and Psychotherapy From Randomized Clinical Trials. J. Clin. Psychol 2005; 61 (7) 835-854,
850 (examining clinical studies and concluding that "the placebo effect is robust" and that it "ap-
proaches the treatment effect").
106 See Wampold, et al. supra note 105, 61 (7) 835, 840 (noting that "there are convincing reasons
to believe that specific [medical] treatment effects and placebo effects are additive" and that one expla-
nation is that "if part of the placebo effect is due to expectations, then general knowledge of the effec-
tiveness of treatments of a particular disorder will likely increase patients' expectations.") This of
course provides pharmaceutical with incentives to harp drugs designed to cure disorders which are
amenable to placebo effects. Indeed, such persuasive advertising can be considered as part of the treat-
ment.
107 First enacted by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, and more recently by the Trade-
mark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98,
109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)), amended by the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730.
108 S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274 ("[T]he pur-
pose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect the public so it may be confident
that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
time and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its mis-
appropriation by pirates and cheats."); see also Gen. Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F.2d 891, 893 (1st Cir.
1925).
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(in the case of false advertising). 9 The law "allows those parties with the
greatest interest in enforcement, and in many situations with the greatest
resources to devote to a lawsuit, to enforce the statute rigorously""0 and be
the public's avengers. "'
Trademark dilution, on the other hand, has been the subject of con-
stant controversy since its introduction into American jurisprudence in
1927 by Professor Schechter." 2 "Dauntingly elusive,""' 3 an "amorphous
concept,"" 4 and "a theory that no one understands"' '"5 are just a few of the
epithets used to describe it. Generally speaking, dilution appears in two
forms: blurring and tamishment. Blurring is the whittling away of a trade-
mark's uniqueness because other sellers, not necessarily of identical goods,
use or modify a trademark to identify their own goods."6 Using "Rolls-
Royce" to brand radio tubes or "Tiffany" for a restaurant are a few exam-
ples." 7 In these cases, there is no concern that the public will be confused.
There is no risk of passing off-consumers are not likely to think that
Rolls-Royce is marketing radio tubes. Nor is there any threat that this use
of the mark would divert trade away from Rolls-Royce. But it would reduce
109 Under Section 32 of the Trademark Act only the "registrant" (that is, the mark owner) can sue
for trademark infringement. 15 U.S.C. § 1114. False advertising and the infringement of unregistered
marks are actionable under Section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (see e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v.
A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217 (holding that Section 43(a) is "the only provision in the
Lanham Act that protects an unregistered mark"). Despite its broad language, however, allowing "any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by", the right to sue is reserved only to the
mark owner (in the case of trademark infringement) or for competitors (in the case of false advertise-
ment) (see McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §27:13 at 27-27
("while the Lanham Act does not explicitly require that the plaintiff be the owner of a protectable mark,
there is no other way that the requisite likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake can occur. That is,
unless plaintiff is the owner of a valid trademark or service mark, the accused designation will not cause
a likelihood of confusion"); See also Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692
(2d Cir. 1971); Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips Foods, Inc., 365 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2004).
110 Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987).
" Gen. Baking, 3 F.2d at 893.
112 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1926).
113 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d
449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999).
114 Am. Express Co., v. Vibra Approved Labs. Corp., No. 87 CIV. 8840 (CSH), 1989 WL 39679,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989).
115 Moskin, supra note 14, at 125.
116 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that
"[d]ilution by blurring occurs when ... 'prospective customers ... see the plaintiffs mark used on a
plethora of different goods and services."') (quoting 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 24:13(1)(a)).
117 See, e.g., Wall v. Rolls-Royce of Am., Inc., 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925); Tiffany & Co. v. Boston
Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc., 264 N.Y.S. 459,
462 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
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the power of the mark to identify a unique seller, because the words "Rolls-
Royce" would trigger associations of a car and a radio tube."8
The second form of dilution, tamishment, occurs when the plaintiffs
trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality or is portrayed in an un-
wholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about
the owner's product, thereby injuring the positive associations that owner
has built up about the trademark. Tamishment claims typically arise in
cases in which a mark is depicted in the context of sexual"9 or illegal activ-
ity '2 or where the defendant pokes fun at another's mark.'2' For example, in
Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, the court enjoined a seller
of a floor wax containing insecticide from using the slogan "Where there's
life there's Bugs" because it trod too near the plaintiffs well-known slo-
gan, "Where there's life there's Bud," and so was tarnishing.'22
2. Anti-Dilution Law Protects the Persuasive Value of Famous
Trademarks
Anti-dilution theory protects the very function of branding that has
elicited hostile reactions from both economists and jurists: persuasiveness.
Professor Brown notes that dilution is "the clearest, most candid, and most
far-reaching claim on behalf of persuasive values" and concludes that, as
such, it should be divorced from the protection of the law. 123 Similarly, the
Augusta National court analogized dilution to "a cancer which, if allowed
to spread, will inevitably destroy the [persuasive] advertising value of the
118 See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 72, at 207 ("Suppose elite brand names, such as 'Tif-
fany' and 'Rolls Royce' were appropriated only by producers of equally fine products. Nevertheless the
distinctiveness of the marks as identifiers of the products sold by the Tiffany and Rolls Royce compa-
nies would be reduced. More mental time and effort... would be required to associate the name with a
particular product. The result would be an increase in consumer search costs. This is the 'blurring'
effect of which the dilution cases speak.").
119 See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., Civ. No. C78-679A, 1981 WL 1402, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (describing defendant's publication of a picture featuring figures resembling
the plaintiffs trade characters engaged in sexual intercourse).
120 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186, 1193 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (enjoining the sale of "Enjoy Cocaine" posters that consisted of the soft drink manufacturer's
"Coca-Cola" mark).
121 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., v. Vibra Approved Labs. Corp., No. 87 CIV. 8840 (CSH), 1989
WL 39679, at *1, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 40-41
(2d Cir. 1994).
122 Chem. Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 434, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1962).
123 Brown, supra note 15, at 1191.
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mark," causing the erosion of its "magic."' 24 Another commentator con-
cluded that anti-dilution laws preserve the "nonrational associations the
shovel maker had succeeded in building up.125 More recently, Professor
Welkowitz warns that dilution "can create artificial barriers to entry into the
marketplace by fostering brand loyalty at the expense of thoughtful deci-
sion making.' 126 Klieger similarly observes that "trademarks serve as the
vessels through which all forms of advertising, both informative and per-
suasive must pass."'1 27 The latter, he argues, is "aimed at the consumer's
heart rather than his mind."' 2s Rather than convey to consumers information
regarding the "physical elements or attributes," it seeks to create an intan-
gible aura. 29 He concludes that "[w]here product differentiation results
from differences in the products' tangible characteristics ... informed con-
sumers rationally pay the premium. But where product differentiation 'is
built primarily on a non-rational or emotional basis, through the efforts of
the ad-man,' consumer willingness to pay the premium proves economi-
cally inefficient."'3 ° Following Professor Brown, he suggests disaggregating
good from bad, informative from persuasive.' Because he believes that
anti-dilution laws protect the persuasive function of trademarks, he urges
that they be abandoned altogether. 1
3 2
3. The Rational Basis for Anti-Dilution's Protection of Famous
Marks
Why did Congress adopted a doctrine that protects only the persuasive
function of branding which courts and commentators deem to be anticom-
124 Augusta Nat'l, Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 210, 221 (S.D. Ga. 1976)
(noting "[d]ilution... 'threatens two separable but related components of advertising value. Junior uses
may blur [the identifying function] or they may tarnish the affirmative associations a mark ... con-
vey(s)') (quoting 3 CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 84-2, at 955).
125 Comment, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-The-Wisp?, 77 HARv. L. REv. 520,
522 (1964).
126 David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531, 584 (1991).
127 Klieger, supra note 28, at 856.
128 Id. at 857.
129 Id. As an example, Klieger cites a survey which found that consumers associate the trade dress
of a Coca-Cola bottle with feelings such as ultimate enjoyment, uniqueness and universal unity. He
deplores that although competitors can deliver a similar physical product-one of equal if not a better
taste than that of Coca-Cola-they cannot match the latter's associations without wasting resources on
persuasive advertising. Id. at 857-58.
130 Id. at 858 (footnote omitted) (quoting BAIN, supra note 21, at 215).
131 See id. at 862-63.
132 Id. at 860-61, 865-66.
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petitive and detrimental? To date, no clear explanation exists.'33 The preva-
lent view is that anti-dilution laws are intended to protect only the trade-
mark owner and secure the selling power of a famous trademark: its ability
to draw future sales.'34 Other reasons often mentioned as possible justifica-
tions are: protection of the trademark owner against encroachment on its
newly established property right in gross; 35 protection of the mark's owner
against the misappropriation of his investment in advertising; 36 trespass
upon the owner's property;3 3 an "unauthorized taking"; 13 the impediment
to the trademark's owner ability to expand his trade to other lines or fields
of enterprise;' protection against confusing uses; 4 ' protection against uses
that may render his mark generic;'' protection against the theft of the im-
age and prestige the trademark owner has created;"' and protection against
cheap copies.43
In contrast to this controversy, there exists a universal consensus that
the aim of anti-dilution law is to protect the owner of the mark rather than
consumers,144 and that this is a departure from the consumer-protection ba-
sis to a "radical business-friendly" regime. 41 In its most recent trademark
decision, the Supreme Court noted that "[u]nlike traditional infringement
133 See Moskin, supra note 14, at 122 (stating that dilution is "a phenomenon that cannot be seen,
measured or otherwise perceived or detected" and one that "has proven wholly resistant to analysis").
134 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39,45 (2d Cir. 1994).
135 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Chem. Corp.
of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 1962); Klieger, supra note 23, at 806;
Moskin, supra note 14, at 143.
136 Stork Rest. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1948); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods.,
Inc., 264 N.Y.S. 459, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Welkowitz, supra note 126, at 584 ("The real justification
for the use of dilution is more the protection of marks against misappropriation than against 'whittling
away."'). But see Ty Inc., v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the misappropria-
tion rationale).
137 Moskin, supra note 14, at 132; Welkowitz, supra note 126, at 534.
138 Moskin, supra note 14, at 131.
139 Schechter, supra note 112, at 823.
140 Comment, supra note 125, at 523, 531.
141 3A CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 22:13, at 22-134 to -138, § 22:14, at 22-237; Moskin, supra
note 14, at 124, 128, 149; Welkowitz, supra note 126, at 548; Comment, supra note 125, at 523, 531.
But see Ty Inc., 306 F.2d at 514 (rejecting the genericism rationale).
142 Am. Express Co., v. Vibra Approved Labs. Corp., No. 87 CIV. 8840 (CSH), 1989 WL 39679,
at *1, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989); Augusta Nat'l, Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 210, 221 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
143 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 72, at 208-09.
144 See id. at 207; Graeme W. Dinwoodie, The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection (2000), in
U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 59, 76 (Hugh Hansen ed., 2006) ("Dilution protection
moves trademark law away from its basic purpose of mutual consumer and producer protection, and
instead focuses solely on protecting the producer."); Schechter, supra note 112, at 825.
145 Klieger, supra note 28, at 805-06.
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law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution.., are not motivated by an
interest in protecting consumers." '146
Describing anti-dilution as creating a sort of an exclusive property
right that inures only to the benefit of producers, some critics have raised
questions as to the constitutionality of the doctrine.147 Congress can grant an
exclusive intellectual property right only under the Patent-Copyright
Clause. 48 This clause requires that an exclusive property right be given
only to original "writings and discoveries" and even then for a "limited
time" only.'49 Because trademarks are neither, 5 ' in enacting the Trademark
(Lanham) Act, Congress had to rely on the less powerful Commerce
Clause.' But as Jacobs notes, Congress cannot escape the limitations of
the Patent-Copyright Clause or those limitations on Congress's authority
would be meaningless."'5 Thus, a right granted under the Commerce Clause
cannot be exclusive and permanent. If anti-dilution theory elevates a right
in a mark to the level of an exclusive property right, it may be found un-
constitutional.
Another issue arising under the dilution doctrine is the "fame" re-
quirement. Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and the more recent
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, only "famous" marks can enjoy anti-
dilution protection.' Many have criticized this requirement, arguing that
146 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003).
147 See, e.g., Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 161 (2004).
148 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
149 The Patent-Copyright Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power ... to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. (emphasis added). The Commerce Clause
provides that "Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the Several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
150 A right in a mark can potentially last forever. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058. The Supreme Court has
also held that trademarks are not original "writings." Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
151 Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in
the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 540 (2000).
152 Id. at 538-39 ("Congress cannot use a power other than the Intellectual Property Clause-most
importantly, its power to regulate interstate commerce-to enact exclusive rights inconsistent with the
substantive constraints imposed by that clause.").
153 Section 43(c)(2)(A)(1) of the Trademark Act, as amended by the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act of 2006, provides that "a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public
of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner. In deter-
mining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant
factors, including the following: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and pub-
licity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties; (ii) The amount,
volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (iii) The extent of
actual recognition of the mark [and] (iv) Whether the mark was registered .... 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125
(LexisNexis 2006).
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stronger marks are better able to withstand diluting effects.' 54 It is the
weaker and newer marks, they argue, which are more likely to suffer from
imitation of their brands' name.'55 They therefore conclude that the theory
should be extended to protect unknown trademarks.'56
4. A New Rational Basis
An analysis recognizing the value of intangible products reveals that
anti-dilution laws inure to the benefit of both producers and consumers.
Further, they do not elevate a right in a mark to an exclusive property right
in gross, but rather secure the traditional role of the trademark owner as the
avenger of the public. This analysis allays the constitutional concerns that
have been raised and explains the fame requirement.
As described above, when the consumer purchases a good bearing a
famous mark, she receives three products: a physical product (e.g., a Ferrari
car, a Cartier watch or a L'Oreal body lotion), information about the physi-
cal product, and an intangible product. The physical product is under her
full control and is subject to the regular wear and tear of life. A Ferrari en-
gine will wear out, a watch will submit to entropy and stop, and the lotion
will age and need to be replaced. But that is the only hazard the consumer
bears with respect to the physical product. Because the physical product is
in the possession of the consumer, no one can exploit it without her permis-
sion.
The intangible product, on the other hand, will not suffer from the dis-
eases that are unique to tangible assets. It can last as long as the physical
product to which it is attached. Unlike the physical product, however, it is
not under the buyer's control. The buyer receives the right to use or enjoy
the intangible psychological effect attached to the product (conveyed by the
famous mark), but the mark can be eroded, or diluted, if, for example, the
public learns to associate the mark with an unsavory image. If the public
learns to associate "Coca-Cola" with drug consumption,'57 or "Bud" beers
with bugs,' then instead of conveying a hedonistic life-style, a sense of
freedom, or just a pleasing association, the intangible product will subject a
consumer who purchased these goods to ridicule or disgust. Contamination
of the mark destroys the value to the consumer. The product's physical
154 3A CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 22:14, at 22-229; Klieger, supra note 28, at 846; Moskin,
supra note 14, at 142; Welkowitz, supra note 126, at 540 ("If anything, weaker marks are more likely to
suffer .... ).
155 Welkowitz, supra note 126, at 540.
156 See, e.g., 3A CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 21.12, at 21-53.
157 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
158 Chem. Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
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value will remain the same, but such tarnishing diminishes the emotional
experience and the image that accompany it.
Contamination or, to use the trademark lingo, dilution, divests an arti-
cle from its psychological freight (or even worse, replaces a positive psy-
chological association with a negative one) and renders that freight worth-
less. The third party that destroys the aura of the famous mark inflicts an
externality on both consumers and the producer. He appropriates the posi-
tive image of feeling associated with the mark to his own benefit without
internalizing the costs of such appropriation. Using the slogan "Never
Leave Home Without It" in connection with the sale of condoms as a spoof
of American Express's "Don't Leave Home Without It" campaign could
damage the image of decency and respect that the credit card company has
created.'59 It will also decrease consumers' utility from showing a prestig-
ious card and may lead to a decrease in consumption. This is not to say that
there are no benefits from such an appropriation. For example, using the
mark "Rolls-Royce" to sell radio tubes could provide consumers with the
information that the radio tubes are of high quality. But the producer of the
radio tube has other ways to describe its product without inflicting costs on
others. The producer could also invest resources in coining new marks to
convey the desired message, if it so wishes, and consequently enrich the
language. The psychological freight of a mark, however, is still subject to
"wear and tear." If the producer does not maintain the magnetism of its
trademark-by advertising the mark and prosecuting those who infringe
it-the mark will gradually lose its psychological effect. This "wear and
tear," however, may take time and can be reasonably expected by the con-
sumer. Also, producers are not keen to jeopardize their marks' sales appeal,
because it would detract from their ability to attract prospective custom-
ers. 1
60
As concerns consumers' interests, this analysis is backward looking. It
protects consumers' ex ante expectations from the time of purchase against
the diminution of their intangible property from the hazard of a possible
externality.' 61 For producers, on the other hand, anti-dilution law is forward
looking. It protects the mark's ability to draw prospective customers.
159 Am. Express Co., v. Vibra Approved Labs. Corp., No. 87 CIV. 8840 (CSH), 1989 WL 39679,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989).
160 In a non-formal survey it was possible to find promises by producers that they will protect the
image of their product. See, e.g., Haz Hotels, Int'l, LLC Brochure, http://www.hazhotels.com/Marquis
Brochure.pdf ("We Will Protect our Brand and Maintain its Superiority-Strong brand standards are
what defines us from others and will keep bringing our guests back to us.").
161 This analysis holds true for both durable and non-durable (or even perishable) products. In the
case of durable goods, for example a Ferrari car, anti-dilution law protects the premium the consumer
paid for fame and status. The consumer's expectation is that during the post-purchase period, the car's
reputation will be protected from a third party's detrimental activity. In the case of non-durable goods,
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The analysis offered here sheds some new light on the classification of
trademark law in the family of intellectual property rights, whose other
members-copyright, patent and trade-secret law-have always received
preferable treatment as "real" intellectual property rights.162 Trademark can
also join this "hall of fame," so to speak, by protecting the intellectual
property of consumers. This analysis argues in favor of the expansion of the
dilution doctrine. While courts usually find tamishment when a positive
association is replaced by a negative one, a better formulation of the test
would protect against associations which are not consistent with the image
created by a mark's owner. A Ferrari consumer, for example, would not
want the mark of her prestigious car affixed to a fast food chain, no matter
what the chain's quality, even if it is the "best" of its kind. Such a use will
not only blur the mark's distinctiveness, but it will also create an associa-
tion that Ferrari owners would likely oppose.
C. Price Discrimination
1. "Like Grade and Quality"
Charging different prices for the same physical goods bearing differ-
ent marks may be illegal for two reasons. First, it may deceive the public as
to the quality of the products involved. Because the public reasonably as-
sumes that products bearing different marks are of different quality, affix-
ing different labels to the same product may mislead consumers to pay
more for what they could have purchased for less.'63 Second, it may also be
such as a Coca-Cola drink, the immediate consumption of the product (by definition) will not endure for
a long period of time, and so post-purchase protection is not required. Yet the consumer enjoys the
psychological effects that accompany this consumption. One survey, for example, found that consumers
associate Coca-Cola bottles with feelings such as ultimate enjoyment, uniqueness, and universal unity.
See Klieger, supra note 28, at 857-58. If the young or cool image conveyed by the mark is destroyed,
the consumer will not be willing to pay more than the product's marginal cost of production. She will
also bear the switching cost associated with adapting to a new product which is able to convey a similar
signal-assuming such a product exists. Most likely, however, a substitute product would not be avail-
able to convey the same signal (or confer the same psychological effects), in which case the consumer's
surplus would decrease further. In some cases, immediate consumption may even increase the premium
for prestige. For example, a lavish vacation signals wealth because only wealthy people would spend so
much on such a short-duration product.
162 See e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 72, at 166 ("Trademarks are a distinct form of intellec-
tual property from patents and copyrights. In some respect trademark law is closer to tort law (indeed,
from a technical legal standpoint, trademark law is part of the branch of tort law known as 'unfair com-
petition') than to property law").
163 Consol. Books Publishers v. FTC, 53 F.2d 942, 944 (7th Cir. 1931); 1A CALLMANN, supra note
31, § 5:11, at 5-72 to -74 ("It is reasonable to assume that the use of different trademarks suggests that
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considered a form of price discrimination."6 Section 2(a) of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act ("RPA"), 165 provides that it
is unlawful for a seller to either directly or indirectly discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or to create a monopoly or to injure competition.'66
A threshold inquiry concerning a violation of Section 2(a) is, there-
fore, whether the physically identical commodities bearing different marks
are "of like grade and quality." This very question was discussed in FTC v.
Borden.'67 Borden produced and sold evaporated milk under its own nation-
ally advertised brand and under various private brands owned by its retail
customers.'68 Although the private-label milk was chemically identical to
the Borden brand, the latter was sold at a substantially higher price.'69 The
FTC found the milk sold under the Borden and the private labels to be of
like grade and quality and the price differential discriminatory and so is-
sued a cease-and-desist order. 7° The Fifth Circuit set aside the Commis-
sion's order, holding that the private label milk was not of the same grade
and quality as the milk sold under the Borden brand because, in determin-
the products to which they are attached are different in nature, quality or characteristics. It is, therefore,
just as deceptive for the same seller to market the identical product under different trademarks as it is to
sell the same article under different prices without any justification."); 1 CALLMANN, supra note 31, §
4:54, at 4-587.
164 1 CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 4:54, at 4-587; 1A CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 5:55, at 5-270.
165 15 U.S.C.S. § 13(a) (LexisNexis 2006).
166 Id. Under Section 2(a) the plaintiff must show: (1) a cognizable difference in price; (2) between
two buyers purchasing contemporaneously from the same seller; (3) of commodities; (4) of like grade
and quality; (5) that may injure competition. Dyno Nobel, Inc. v. Amotech Corp. 63 F. Supp. 2d. 140,
147 (D.P.R. 1999). The law allows the following defenses to price discrimination claims: (a) to "meet
competition"; (b) if there is a "cost justification" (the lower price resulted from a "due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from differing methods or quantities");
(c) if the price difference results from a "response to changing conditions affecting the market for or
marketability of the goods" (e.g., perishable goods). 15 U.S.C.S. § 13(a) (LexisNexis 2006). Some
courts also seem to allow the "functional availability" defense: the seller offered the same commodity at
different prices, but the lower price was available to all buyers. See, e.g., FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977). Callmann seems to
reject the availability defense in the trademark context, stating that, "the public may also be deceived
when a manufacturer chooses a form of dual distribution, selling the same product under one trademark
at a higher price, and under a different trademark or without trademark at a lesser price.... That the
consumer may not know of the cheaper alternative makes no difference; because, even if he should
learn about it, his confidence in the trademarked product will deceive him into the belief that it is of
better quality." IA CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 5:11, at 5-74.
167 FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
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ing whether products are of like grade and quality, consideration should be
given to all commercially significant distinctions "whether they be physical
or promotional."' 7 If customers are willing to pay more for the "Borden"
name, the court reasoned, that product is of unlike grade.' In reversing this
decision, the Supreme Court adopted the FTC's view that physical com-
parison alone determines whether products are of like grade and quality.'73
The Court explained that because "like grade and quality" is a threshold
requirement essential to RPA applicability, producers must not be able to
differentiate their products merely by affixing different labels, thereby im-
munizing themselves from Section 2 scrutiny.'74 The Court noted, however,
that "tangible consumer preferences" as between branded and unbranded
commodities can receive due legal recognition in the more flexible "injury
to competition" and "cost justification" provisions.'75 It therefore remanded
the case so that it could be ascertained whether the price discrimination
resulted in a competitive harm.'76
Borden is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's longstanding policy
that "the public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice may be
171 Id. at 639; Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
172 The Fifth Circuit was clear that mere affixation of different labels to physically identical prod-
ucts would not suffice. Borden, 339 F.2d at 138. Rather, a showing of a "demonstrable consumer pref-
erence" for one brand over the other would be required to conclude that the two products are of different
grade. Id. at 137.
173 See also Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 556 (1990); DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washing-
ton Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1517 (1 1th Cir. 1989) ("If products are physically identical,
despite differences in labeling or branding, then they are 'of like grade and quality' for the purpose of
stating a prima facie Robinson-Patman Act case, even though consumers may prefer a higher priced
'premium product."'); 14 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 2315 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2005); IA
CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 7:29, at 7-96 to -98.
174 Borden, 383 U.S. at 643-44 ("We doubt that Congress intended to foreclose these inquiries in
situations where a single seller markets the identical product under several different brands, whether his
own, his customers' or both. Such transactions are too laden with potential discrimination and adverse
competitive effect to be excluded from the reach of § 2(a) by permitting a difference in grade to be
established by the label alone or by the label and its consumer appeal.").
175 Id. at 646.
176 Id. at 647. On remand, the Fifth Circuit found that, "by increased advertising and promotional
efforts over the years, Borden has created a decided consumer preference for milk bearing a Borden
label." Borden, 381 F.2d at 180. It found no evidence that "Borden's price differential exceeds the
recognized consumer appeal of the Borden label nor.., that the prices [were] unreasonably high for
Borden brand milk on the one hand, or unrealistically low for the private label milk on the other." Id. at
181; see also In re Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280 (1984) (finding that the a price differential
ranging from 25 percent to 38 percent between private-label products and a national brand did cause an
injury to consumers because it could be explained by consumer preferences and the substantially greater
costs associated with promoting the national brand).
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dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance.' 177 Borden stands
in direct contrast with the Court's decisions in Royal Milling and Algoma
Lumber, which held that consumers "have a right" to purchase "a given
article because it was made by a particular manufacturer... and this right
cannot be satisfied by imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one
equally as good.' '7 Borden also leads to a legal anomaly: anti-dilution law
recognizes and fosters persuasive advertising, whereas price discrimination
law ignores the same persuasive value and unreasonably impairs the ability
of producers to capitalize on their investment.
Moreover, Borden leads to absurd results. For example, under Borden,
absent a patent, two manufacturers may produce the same product under
different brands and charge their respective retailers different prices with-
out being subject to the RPA. However, a manufacturer that charges differ-
ent prices for the same product sold under different labels would be subject
to the "flexible" and nebulous "injury to competition" and "cost justifica-
tion" provisions although there is no economic rationale to treat the two
cases differently. Borden also gives rise to a chilling effect. Subjecting
manufacturers to the more flexible tests of the RPA deters them, ex ante,
from selling the same product under different brands, thus limiting compe-
tition in the psychic space.7 9
This article's analysis argues that a manufacturer should be allowed to
sell physically identical goods under different marks and command differ-
ent prices without being subject to antitrust inquiry. Competition in this
model occurs in two dimensions: the physical space and the psychic space.
The following example is illustrative. Consider an economy with two pro-
ducers. Producer A manufactures a widget at price PA, branded with a
trademark of renown TA, and producer B manufactures the same widget at
price PB, branded with a trademark of renown TB, such that TB>TA and
PA0PB. The price of each widget can be broken into three components: the
177 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
178 FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216 (1933); see also Borden, 383 U.S. at 651-52
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Commercially the 'advertised' brands had come in the minds of the public to
mean a different grade of milk. The public may have been wrong... it may have been right .... But
right or wrong, that is what it believed, and its belief was the important thing.").
179 See, e.g., J. C. Bruno, Business Problems and Planning: Negotiating Private Label Agreements,
74 MICH. B.J. 1292, 1293 (1995). The author offers a model "Policy Guidelines for Private Labeling" to
be adopted by a manufacturer. Id. at 1292-94. In Section 5, "Pricing," the author suggests:
[A] Private Label product identical to the Corporation's brand product, except that it carries
a distributor's label, should be sold at the same price as the Corporation's brand is sold to the
Corporation distributor... [and] a sale to a Private Label distributor should be at the same
price as a sale to a brand name distributor. No variation from standard pricing should be
granted without a written analysis as to why the price was charged, e.g., to meet competition
or differences in cost or performance ....
Id. at 1292-93.
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price for the tangible product itself; the premium charged for the informa-
tion embedded in the mark with regard to the products' physical qualities;
and the premium charged for the psychological freight. The two producers
are in direct competition in the market for the physical good, and thus its
price will be less than a monopoly price. There is no competition, however,
in the market for fame because TB>TA, and so the prices consumers are
willing to pay for the two widgets' psychological freight will differ (be-
cause consumers are, in fact, receiving products of different value).
In this setting price discrimination may lower prices. Cartier and
Swatch, for example, are brand names that (ignoring quality differences)
compete in a market for tangible goods-watches. Cartier, however, sells
an "image" of luxury, while Swatch sells an "image" of being young in
spirit and hip. Allowing each producer to manufacture the same article un-
der different labels and charge different prices will enhance social welfare
because it will result in an increase of output of the physical product, and
assuming economies of scale, decrease marginal costs of production. It will
also enable competition in the market for psychological freight. Cartier
might sell the same watch under a brand aimed at young spirited consum-
ers, thereby competing with Swatch. This will lead to a reduction in the
fame premium (up to the marginal cost of branding) and result in a total
decrease in price. Price discrimination in this setting is desirable.
Price discrimination may be also desirable even in the absence of
competition. Assume that a manufacturer that enjoys a monopoly in a
product market (perhaps because of a patent) decides (because of Borden)
to market its product under one label only. As a monopolist, the manufac-
turer will choose the output Qi and branding investment leading to trade-
mark fame of T1, which will maximize its profits. Enabling the monopolist
to sell more of the same product under different labels with a different
trademark level T2 (T2# T1 ) will lead to an increase in output of the same
physical product. Assuming without limitation that T2<Tl, consumers who
could not afford the more prestigious product would be able to purchase the
same physical product under the less prestigious label (P2<P1). The increase
in output is also likely to cause a further decrease in the marginal cost of
production. Allowing a monopolist to price discriminate is therefore a Pa-
reto superior solution.
In Borden, the Supreme Court provided two examples to explain why
transactions involving physically identical products bearing different labels
are "too laden with potential discrimination and adverse competitive effect"
to be excluded from RPA's reach. 8' These examples, however, do not sup-
port the court's view.
180 Borden, 383 U.S. at 643-44.
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First, the Court deplored that a "retailer who was permitted to buy and
sell only the more expensive brand would have no chance to sell to those
who always buy the cheaper product."'' The Court failed to recognize that
the two products are not substitutes. The branded product and the
unbranded one constitute two different products that provide different val-
ues to consumers. Consumers who are willing to pay more for the nation-
ally advertised label do not do so because they are ignorant or irrational.
They are willing to pay more because they receive added value from the
famous label. Consumers of the cheaper brand may not be potential con-
sumers of the famous label. Thus, the retailer of the branded product is not
harmed.
Merger analysis applies this more sensible approach.'82 In Gillette, the
District Court for the District of Columbia arrived at the opposite conclu-
sion in discussing the relevant market for merger analysis.'83 Gillette
wanted to merge with Parker Pen Holdings.'84 The Department of Justice
sought to enjoin the merger on the ground that it would reduce competi-
tion.'85 The court found that the fountain pen market can be divided into
three sub-markets: "base" pens (less than $50); "premium" pens ($50 to
$400); and "jewelry" pens ($400 and up).'86 Premium pens, it reasoned, do
not compete with base pens because premium pens "afford their users (as
well as those who merely put them in their breast pockets) image, prestige,
and status."' 87 Because of this prestige component, should the price of a
premium pen rise, "consumers will nonetheless purchase the now-costlier
pen rather than substitute a less expensive, less prestigious model."'88 Thus
the Court concluded that the two types of pens are not in competition be-




182 See Thomas B. Leary, The Significance of Variety in Antitrust Analysis, http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/leary/atljva4.htm.
183 United States. v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 80-82 (D.D.C 1993) (analyzing facts under § 7
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and finding the relevant product market to be all premium writing
instruments with suggested retail prices from $50 to $400).
184 Id. at 80.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 83.
187 Id. at82.
188 Id.
189 Gillette, 828 F. Supp. at 82. The court's analysis is intuitively compelling:
[F]ountain pens in the $50 to $400 range effectively do not compete with fountain pens ei-
ther below or above that range .... In contrast to fountain pens with [suggested retail prices]
below $50, the fountain pens [in the $50 to $400 range] afford their users (as well as those
who merely put them in their breast pockets) image, prestige, and status. In accordance with
this prestige, manufacturers, retailers, and purchasers of the pens recognize that there is a
distinction between these pens, which ... are priced at approximately $50 and up, and those
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The second example given by the Borden court concerns the sale of
the same commodity at different prices by two retailer-owned labels:
If Borden packed for one wholesale customer under two private labels, one having more
consumer appeal than the other because of the customer's own advertising program, Borden
must sell both brands at the same price it charges other private label customers because all
such milk is of the same grade and quality. At the same time, the [wholesaler] buying from
Borden under two labels could himself sell one label at a reduced price without inquiry un-
der §2(a) because the milk in one container is no longer of the same grade and quality as that
in the other, although both the milk and the containers came from Borden. Such an approach
would obviously focus not on consumer preference as determinative of grade and quality but
on who spent the advertising money that created the preference-Borden's customer [the
wholesaler], not Borden, created the preference and hence the milk is of the same grade and
quality in Borden's hands but not in its customer's. The dissent would exempt the effective
advertiser from the Act. We think Congress intended to remit him to his defenses under the
Act, including that of cost justification.' 90
The so-called "effective advertiser" should be rewarded because it was
that "advertiser" who created the added value (that is, the psychological
freight). 91 Thus, the advertiser should be able to sell a physically identical
product at different prices without being subject to the risk that he may be
found liable for antitrust violation. Exempting the advertiser from the risk
of the RPA will unambiguously lead to an increase in output and total wel-
fare. This proposed regime has been adopted in Canada. 9 Section 50(1)(a)
of the Canadian Competition Act is very similar to Section 2 of the RPA. 193
It prohibits any seller from discriminating, directly or indirectly, in price
between different purchasers "of articles of like quality and quantity.' 94
Yet the enforcement agency takes the view that a trademark or label alone,
to the extent that it gives rise to a consumer preference which is reflected in
the price consumers are willing to pay for an article, is sufficient to distin-
guish otherwise similar articles.'95 In circumstances mirroring the facts of
Borden, Canada's enforcement guidelines allow that "the brand differentia-
pens which are priced below this threshold. The evidence suggests that, should the price of a
fountain pen costing, for example, $60 be increased in a non-trivial, non-transitory fashion,
consumers will nonetheless purchase the now-costlier pen rather than substitute a less expen-
sive, less prestigious model. In other words, there is a low cross-elasticity of demand be-
tween these pens and those priced below $50.
Id. at 82.
190 FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 645 (1966).
191 See id. at 645 n.6.
192 Canadian Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, 50(l)(a) (2006).
193 Compare Canadian Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, 50(1)(a) (2006), with 15 U.S.C. §13
(2006).
194 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, 50(1)(a) (2006).
195 See BUREAU OF COMPETITION POLICY, CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES § 2.5.8.1 (1992), reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1582, at S-14 (Sep. 17, 1992).
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tion will generally be sufficient to cause the Director to conclude that the
articles are not of 'like quality."'"96 It is suggested here that a similar inter-
pretation be adopted with regard to the RPA.
197
2. "Commodities," Famous Brands, and the Tangibility Require-
ment
Even if the Borden decision holds, the RPA still may not apply where
products are sold under famous marks because such products may not be
considered "commodities" for the RPA's purposes. Section 2(a) of the RPA
provides that it is unlawful for a seller to either directly or indirectly dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality.'98 Although the RPA contains no definition of the term
"commodity" courts have interpreted the term to apply only to tangible
products.'" Thus, it has been held, for example, that the RPA does not ap-
ply to the sale of services,200 mutual fund shares,2"' or licensing agree-
ments.20 2 The distinction between tangible products (which are subject to
the RPA) and intangible ones (which are not), however, is not always clear.
This is because a transfer of a tangible asset is often accompanied by a
transfer of an intangible asset. To determine whether a certain transaction
196 Id.
197 During a House hearing on the legislation, it was proposed that § 2(a) be amended to read "like
grade and quality and brand" so that discrimination between different brands would be allowed. To
Amend the Clayton Act. Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 4995 and HR. 8442 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 74th Cong. 421 (1936). The amendment was not adopted. During the debate on the bill, Rep.
Patman was asked about the private-label issue. See 80 Cong. Rec. 8115 (1936) (statement of Rep.
Taylor). In response, Rep. Patman stated that, "the bill will protect the [retailers who use private labels]
... because they will have to sell to the independents at the same price for the same product where they
put the same quality of merchandise in a package... [irrespective of the brand] so long as it is the same
quality." Id. (statement of Rep. Patman). But the dissent in Borden argues:
[O]n its face, Mr. Patman's statement makes the blanket assertion that all products of the
same quality must be sold at the same price. As thus stated, premium brands would have to
be sold at the same price as private label brands .... These undifferentiated remarks are
therefore of little assistance in the determination of congressional intent.
Borden, 383 U.S. at 654 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
198 15 U.S.C.S. § 13(a) (2006).
199 See, e.g., Advanced Office Sys., Inc. v. Accounting Sys. Co., 442 F. Supp. 418, 422 (D.S.C.
1977) ("Courts have uniformly held that the term 'commodities' as used in the Robinson-Patman Act..
• is restricted to products, merchandise, or other tangible goods .... "); La Salle St. Press, Inc. v.
McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. I11. 1968) (stating that a patent license
agreement is an "intangible right" and not covered by the RPA), affd, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971).
200 Morning Pioneer Inc., v. Bismarck, 493 F.2d 383, 389 n.1 1(8th Cir. 1974).
201 Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 409 F.2d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1969).
202 La Salle St. Press, 293 F. Supp. at 1004.
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falls under the provisions of the RPA, courts rely on the "dominant nature
of the transaction.""2 3 In Freeman, for example, the Seventh Circuit found
that the RPA does not apply to the sale of title insurance, even though the
insurer provided the purchaser with a tangible product-a document." 4 The
court explained that the performance of a service, and not the delivery of a
physical document which embodies that service, constitutes the dominant
nature of the transaction.2 5
Because a product sold under a famous mark is comprised of tangible
and intangible products, it should not be considered a commodity. This is
especially the case where the psychological asset is the true product and the
tangible product is nothing but a platform. In such cases, the "dominant
nature" of the product is its intangible aura, and therefore its sale should not
be subject to the RPA.2 °6 Under this approach, the sale of a branded good is
a two-part transaction: a complete sale of a physical product (and informa-
tion regarding that product) and a licensing agreement that gives the con-
sumer the right to use and enjoy the psychological asset attached to the
product. As part of this license, the producer promises to maintain the
mark's fame, such as by prosecuting infringers or third parties who cause
dilution.2 7 The licensing of intellectual property (although in other con-
texts) has been already recognized by the federal courts as not subject to the
RPA.2°1 Exempting branded products that embody intangible products,
therefore, is consistent with prior cases.
203 Tri-State Broad. Co. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 369 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Virtually no
transfer of an intangible in the nature of a service, right, or privilege can be accomplished without the
incidental involvement of tangibles, and we conclude that in such circumstances the dominant nature of
the transaction must control in determining whether it falls within the provisions of the Act."). The
"dominant nature" test is not applicable, however, when the two products-the tangible and intangi-
ble-can be sold separately. See, e.g., Metro Commc'n Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Commc'ns Inc., 984 F.
2d 739, 745 (6th Cir. 1993). In such cases, only the physical product would be subject to the RPA. See,
e.g., id.
204 Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1974).
205 Id.; see also Kennedy Theater Ticket Serv. v. Ticketron, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 922, 926 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (holding that a right to a seat in a theater is the dominant nature of the transaction, even though
the theater ticket is tangible).
206 Dominant nature is not determined merely by breaking down the costs of the intangible service
and the accompanying tangible good, although it has been held that such a comparison might be useful
as one of many factors to consider. See May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1215
(9th Cir. 1980).
207 See supra Part III.C.l.
208 La Salle St. Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. Ill.
1968) (holding that a patent license agreement granting the right to use a particular method or process is
not a "commodity").
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3. A Practical Note
Although Borden and the Supreme Court's policy have been subject to
much scholarly attention, RPA cases regarding the sale of branded and
unbranded products at different prices are not very common. Several rea-
sons may account for this phenomenon. First, agency enforcement of the
RPA has decreased dramatically in recent years.2"9 Private litigation is also
declining due to the RPA's strict requirements and judges' skepticism
about the injurious effects of price discrimination.2"' The judge-made avail-
ability doctrine provides another explanation. Under this doctrine, if a seller
offers different prices for a commodity to different buyers, but the lowest
price is available to all, there is no RPA liability. Applying the availability
theory to the dual-branding setting, there should be no RPA liability where
a manufacturer offers its customers both the premium and non-premium
brands. "
Yet RPA liability is a valid concern. To begin with, private RPA en-
forcement, fueled by the prospects of treble damages, is still commonplace.
Moreover, availability doctrine is not a comprehensive defense. To rely on
the availability doctrine, the manufacturer must demonstrate that the lower
price was practically available to its customers and that they were informed
of its availability.2"2 Thus to employ the availability defense, a manufacturer
must inform its customers that its branded and unbranded products are
physically identical. But, as Callmann notes, "[t]o insist that the manufac-
turer reveal the true facts [about the physical identity] would lead to the
209 The Department of Justice's Antitrust Division has never used its authority to prosecute under
Section 2 of the RPA and has been openly critical of the Act. See United States Department of Justice,
Report on the Robinson-Patman Act 149, 169 (1977) ("[T]he Act is made inherently capable of serious
harm to society; indeed the more the statute is enforced and the more it is complied with, the greater
becomes its harmful effects [sic] on competition."); see also WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW
HANDBOOK § 4-2 (2005); EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH. P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 30-3
(1983); ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 1290 (5th ed., 2003); IRVING SCHER,
ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 9-40 (4th ed. 2005). Similarly, since 1980, the FTC has attempted to enforced
the Act only twice. See PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 209, at 1290. Of these two attempts, the first was
abandoned and the second settled. Id.
210 See PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 209, at 1290.
211 Indeed, the dissent in Borden applied this approach. FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 659-60
n.17 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[S]o long as Borden makes private label brands available to all
customers of its premium milk, it is unlikely that price discrimination within the meaning of § 2(a) can
be made out.").
212 See Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 19 F.3d 745, 752 (1st
Cir. 1994) ("[Olne could [not] say that a seller has made favored treatment 'available' to a disfavored
customer if the disfavored customer does not know about the favored treatment."); DeLong Equip. Co.
v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1517 (1 th Cir. 1989); Century Hardware Corp. v.
Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350, 355-56 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
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termination of that system of dual distribution."2"3 Thus the applicability of
the doctrine in the trademark context is not practical.
Furthermore, the scope of the doctrine may be limited so as to provide
defense only against injuries to end customers. This is because the concep-
tual basis underlying the doctrine is unclear. It is an unsettled matter
whether availability of the lower price simply negates a finding of price
discrimination, or instead whether it is a defense against the substantial
injury requirement.214 If the former, availability would provide absolute
immunity to the manufacturer-seller. Under this view, dual pricing creates
only a price differential but not price discrimination. If, however, availabil-
ity is a defense only against injury, then it would bar only the disfavored
customer-who had the option to buy the same commodity at a lower price
but chose not to do so-from asserting an injury, but would be no bar to the
manufacturer's competitors, who lost sales because of the dual pricing.2"5
Manufacturers who wish to use dual pricing are therefore still exposed to
antitrust liability.
213 CALLMANN, supra note 31, § 5-74.
214 For authorities holding that the availability of lower price negates the finding of price discrimi-
nation, see Rod Baxter Imps. Inc. v. Saab Scania of Am., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 245, 248 n.2 (D. Minn.
1980); HOLMES, supra note 204, at 628; PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 209, at 1285; SCHER, supra note
209, at § 4-64. For authorities raising both bases as possible explanations, see DeLong Equipment, 887
F.2d at 1517; KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 209, § 19-5; Ira M. Millstein, The Status of "Availability"
Under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 416, 417-18,426 (1967).
215 See K1NTNER & BAUER, supra note 209, §§ 20-18, 25-7; SCHER, supra note 209, § 4-17; Mill-
stein, supra note 214, at 427-28. But not all agree:
It is arguable that any injury which results to competitors of the seller, which lose sales be-
cause of the selective price cutting, indeed flows from that discrimination regardless of the
options which where open to the disfavored buyer; it might then follow that primary line ac-
tions are not covered by the "availability" defense.... [Other] courts . . . have concluded
that [the] second line analysis is preferable. Furthermore, at least one court has accepted this
[view] and has suggested that primary line actions might not be barred by the availability de-
fense.
... [Others] accepted have [that] ... the refusal by a buyer of a reasonable available offer of
goods at an equally low price bars all types of price discrimination actions. [They explain
that] any injury that competing sellers suffer is not the result of the price discrimination but
rather the result of the lower price offered to, and accepted by, some buyers. If all buyers had
accepted the lower price freely made available to them, the competing sellers would have
suffered even greater injury.... [Tihere is absence of the necessary nexus between the lower
price to some buyers and the injury to the competing sellers.
KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 209, § 25:7, at 455; see also Millstein, supra note 214, at 445.
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IV. A FORMAL APPROACH
A. The Basic Model
This Part provides a formal model which shows that the demand for a
branded product is comprised of three components: the demand for the
physical product itself, the demand for information regarding the product's
credence qualities (qualities that cannot be verified even post-purchase);
and the demand for the intangible aura, status, or satisfaction that is an-
nexed to the tangible product. The model is related to that of Stigler and
Becker ("S&B")216 and Becker and Murphy ("B&M").217 Yet it differs in
several important aspects. While B&M's model regards the markets for
goods and ads as complements that can be purchased separately, the model
here regards them as inseparable.218 In certain circumstances one cannot
purchase and consume an advertisement (and its effects) without buying the
physical product it promotes. More importantly, it does not assume that
persuasive advertising "gives favorable notice to other goods."219 In this
respect, it also deviates from signaling models, in which the role of adver-
tising is limited to imparting information about the physical product that
branding endorses. 22' Here, branding creates a new intangible good, which
must piggyback on the physical one. Moreover, S&B conclude that absent
asymmetric information, branding will not occur.2 Conversely, the model
developed below explains why branding may occur in a market with in-
complete information as well as in a perfectly competitive market. The
model also differs from the prior literature in that it provides a theoretical
framework that takes into account both the informational and persuasive
value of advertising and marks.
Dilution, persuasive branding, and price-discrimination are all intra-
brand phenomena. 22 Thus, to model the impact of persuasive branding, I
216 See Stigler & Becker, supra note 32, at 84-85, 87-89.
217 See Becker & Murphy, supra note 13, at 941-45.
218 Id. at 942.
219 Id. at 942, 945. Becker and Murphy's thesis also differs from this article's because it argues
that advertisements "create wants" and increase the demand for the physical product. Id. at 941, 945.
220 This approach to the signaling model is primarily attributed to Phillip Nelson. See supra note
32 and accompanying text.
221 See Stigler & Becker, supra note 32, at 84-85.
222 "Intra-brand" and "inter-brand" denote two distinct phenomena in this article. "Inter-brand"
activity refers to consumers' decisions, which necessarily involve two or more manufacturers. Tradi-
tionally, trademarks' roles have been said to be limited to inter-brand settings. They help consumers
identify the product they want from a set of substitutable products available in the marketplace. Inter-
brand settings often involve a consumer's decision about whether she should choose a product manufac-
tured by producer A over a product manufactured by producer B. Similarly, trademark infringement is
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rely on a model I developed elsewhere to analyze the role of trademarks
and branding in intra-brand settings.223 The model focuses on products
which are characterized by credence qualities (qualities that cannot be veri-
fied even post-purchase) in a world of asymmetric information-that is, the
seller is assumed to know his product's qualities, but the consumer does
not. This analysis shows that consumers of such products incur uncertainty
costs which cannot be eliminated absent trademarks or similar mechanisms.
For example, assume that a consumer at the local Starbucks wishes to add
sweetener to her coffee. She can choose "Equal," "Splenda," or "Stevia"-
to name three of the most common brands. Assume further that she has
already made her (inter-brand) decision to purchase Splenda because she
likes its taste most (an experience quality). Aware of the risks of using as-
partame-based products, over-consuming calories and carbohydrates, and
diabetes, she wants to know a sweetener's nutritional attributes before con-
suming it. If it is a low calorie sweetener or if it is made from an ingredient
that makes it suitable for people with diabetes, she will use it generously; if
high in calories or aspartame-based, she will purchase less of it. Because
she is uncertain whether she faces a "high quality" product or a "low qual-
ity" one, she may make a costly mistake.
The basic model describes a two-step minimization process, which, al-
though simultaneous in reality, is broken into two parts for simplicity and
clarity. In the first stage the buyer chooses her strategy. Based solely upon
her demand curve, the price offered (Po), and her own beliefs about the
product's credence qualities, the buyer decides the optimal quantity she
should purchase. The optimal quantity is that which minimizes her ex-
pected cost from an erroneous choice. As will be shown, although the buyer
can and will minimize her error costs, she cannot eliminate them altogether.
This minimal (but positive) expected error is, therefore, her subjective de-
mand for information about the product's physical attributes-that is, the
amount she would be willing to pay to reduce her error. In the second stage,
the seller chooses his strategy. Once the buyer has minimized her error cost,
the seller decides whether to use a trademark (or other methods of market-
ing) to convey information about his product's physical qualities. The seller
can decide either to inform the consumer about his product's credence at-
tributes or to remain silent. If the seller decides to brand his product and
an inter-brand phenomenon. When producer A palms off his goods as producer B's, inter-brand confu-
sion is created. "Intra-brand" refers to decisions at the manufacturer level. For example, once a con-
sumer has decided which product she should buy, the next question is how many units of that product to
consume. This calls for intra-brand analysis. Similarly, when a seller claims that his own products
possess attributes they actually do not contain, intra-brand confusion arises. A producer's decision to
brand identical physical product under different trademarks is also an intra-brand decision. For a com-
prehensive discussion of the intra-brand function of trademarks see Dilbary, supra note 72).
223 See id.
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convey additional (yet truthful) information to buyers, that activity will
minimize further the expected error cost and (where the product is of high
quality) thereby increase sales. Trademarks thus lead to increase in sales by
reducing buyers' subjective probability of erring. After discussing the in-
formational role of trademarks, the model is extended to persuasive brand-
ing.
1. The Consumer Strategy
Assume the consumer has already made a decision to purchase a cer-
tain product (e.g., Splenda) but is unsure whether the product is of high or
low quality. That is, the consumer is unsure which of the two linear inverse
demand functions she faces:
(1) DV-1: P = a, - bQ
(2) D2-1" P = a2 - bQ
The first, D1 - , stands for a "high-quality" product (the no-calorie
sweetener in the example), and the second, D2- 1, stands for a "low-quality"
product, where a, > a2 > 0, and b > 0.224 Note that the difference in the de-
mand intercepts (a, - a2, which I refer to as the "error span") 225 is the per-
unit quality difference or, in other words, the marginal price difference be-
tween a high-quality product and a low-quality product. This error span is
224 For simplicity, I assume that there are only two possibilities: a "high-quality" product and a
"low-quality" product. For use of a similar assumption see Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational
Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 471 (1981).
This article differs from Grossman's in several respects. Grossman considers two cases, one in which a
seller makes quality statements which are ex post verifiable, and another in which the statements are too
costly to verify ex post but nevertheless have some characteristics which are observable ex post. For
example, the quality of a car is hard to verify, but it is easy to observe whether it breaks down. This
article, on the other hand, discusses credence qualities which are not verifiable and not observable ex
post. In the above example, the consumer would not know even post-purchase whether the sweetener
contains aspartame or is high in calories. Also, unlike Grossman, I do not assume that the seller's state-
ments are truthful or that the consumer can only purchase one unit. Rather, I assume the seller may want
to mislead consumers and that the consumer is purchasing any number of units. One aim of this model
is to investigate how the number of units purchased is affected by a seller's fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions. Moreover, Grossman discusses warranties as a signal that leads to a separating equilibrium: con-
sumers can distinguish between good products (for which warranties would be offered) and bad prod-
ucts. In the context of trademarks, however, a separating equilibrium does not necessarily occur. A low
investment in a mark does not necessarily indicate that the physical product is of low quality. See infra
note 234.
225 Because Qc - QA = (a, - a2)/b, d = IQc - QAI is a linear transformation of the "error span."
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constant for every quantity (Q). For example, if Pl = 100 - 10Q1 and P2 =
80 - 10Q2, then for every unit Q, the consumer values the no-calorie sugar-
based sweetener which is suitable for people with diabetes $20 more than if
it were a high-calorie or aspartame-based one. I assume that the only differ-






0 QA C QC Q
Figure 1: The Expected Cost Due to Uncertainty
Because she lacks information about the tangible product, the buyer is
uncertain about the product's credence qualities. In the example, she is un-
certain whether the sweetener is low in calories and contains no aspar-
tame. 7 Thus she is uncertain whether she faces D, or D2 in Figure 1. The
buyer's belief about the product's quality can be represented by specifying
a probability distribution on Q. Because the model assumes that there are
only two possible states of the world (high-quality products versus low-
quality products), 0 denotes the probability that the buyer places on the
product's quality. 8 More specifically, the buyer believes that the probabil-
ity that the product is of high quality is 0 and that the probability that the
product is of low quality is 1 - 0 (where 0 ! 0 5 1). The buyer may decide
226 For simplicity, I also assume a level of P0 such that a, - a2 < P0. This assumption simplifies the
model by ensuring that the first minimization (the buyer's strategy) could be easily illustrated graphi-
cally.
227 There are many other examples of credence qualities. For example, a consumer may be inter-
ested to know whether a product was made in a certain locality (such as Champagne, Roquefort or
China), whether a product contains or is free of certain ingredients (such as sugar, fat from animals,
etc.), whether it is dairy, kosher or tested on animals, or is hand-made, recyclable, etc. None of these are
easily verifiable or observable ex post by the consumer.
228 It is assumed that the probability of the "high quality" state of the world is known to the seller
and that the consumer cannot affect the probability of the states.
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that the product is of high quality and purchase Qc units, or that it is of low
quality and thus purchase QA units. But if she mistakenly thinks the product
is high quality when it is not, she will purchase Qc units and incur a cost
illustrated by the area ACE, which is the difference between what she paid,
PoCQcO, and what she received, PoAEQcO. In discrete terms, she will in-
cur a cost which is the summation of the difference between what she paid
for each product (P0) and its value to her (presented by the downward-
slopping demand curve). Conversely, if she believes mistakenly that the
product is of low quality, she will purchase QA units and incur a loss de-
noted by the area FAC.
But the buyer has a third choice. She can consume any quantity Q
such that QA < Q < Qc. To find Q*, which minimizes the consumer's error
cost, I choose arbitrarily a quantity x with the only limitation that QA : QA
+ x : Qc. X, therefore, serves as a "dimmer:" the larger it is, the closer the
quantity purchased is to Qc. The smaller it is, the closer the quantity is to
QA. On the extremes, if x = 0, the buyer purchases QA units, and if x = Qc -
QA the buyer purchase Qc units. For every x, it is possible to formulate a
general expected error function:
(3) E(e Q) = (I - 0)SAB + 0SGBC;129 or
bX
2  0(a, -a ) 2
(4) E(ex) = - 0 (a, - a2 )x +
2 2b
The buyer, without any additional information and relying solely upon
her knowledge about the relevant demand curves, will try to avoid the costs
that follow from an error in the assessment of the product by choosing an
x* that minimizes her expected error cost. Rearranging the first-order con-
dition in equation (4) yields x* (and thus Q*), which brings the expected
error function to its extremum:
(5)-dE(e) = * = 0(ax -a 2 ) >0
d( b
(6) E(ex*)  (a a2) [0(1-0)]
Proposition 1: x*, which brings the expected error cost to a minimum,
will be always positive, and the buyer will thus always choose Q* such that
229 Or, more generally: E(e)= (1-01 (P. - D,) + 61 (D2- P0).
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QA < Q* < Qc. Put differently, in a world with uncertainty, the buyer will
never chose Q* such that Q" is equal to either QA or Qc.23°
Corollary 1: From Proposition 1 and Equation 6, it follows that the
expected error, E(e), is always positive and is smaller than the extreme
cases in which the consumer purchases QA or Qc units. That is, 0 < E(eQ*) <
E(e Qa) = E(e Qc).
Corollary 1 implies that even after the buyer has minimized her error
cost by choosing x* > 0, she will still have a positive error-cost, or put dif-
ferently, a positive demand for information as denoted by Equation 6. She
will be willing to buy information about the tangible product that costs no
more than her minimum expected error cost.
Proposition 2: The higher the difference in quality, dla, - a2 l (i.e., the
larger the error span), the higher the maximal error the consumer incurs.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple. The more impact a credence
quality has on the utility a consumer extracts from the product, the higher
the cost to the buyer of an erroneous decision (or mistaken valuation of that
credence quality).
E(e)
E(Q .Qc) = 




x 0, x* = xIV : - .X,Q
Q= QP Q=Qc
Figure 2: The Relation between x and E(e) for 0 = '/2.
Figure 2 summarizes the consumer's strategy. It shows that at the ex-
treme cases where Q=QA or Q=Qc the consumer's expected error cost is at
maximum (for 0 = Y2). The consumer can minimize her error costs by
changing her consumption to x = x* but she will still have to incur an error
230 For a proof of this Proposition and this Part's other propositions and corollaries, see infra
Technical Appendix A.
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cost of EMin = (a, - a2)2/8b. I refer to this point (x*, EMin) as the "point of
ignorance," denoted by the letters Ig. The intuition behind this result is
straightforward. Because, at the first stage of minimization, the buyer has
no information about the product-she is ignorant as to its credence attrib-
utes-she has a 50% chance of making an error (that is, 0 = /2).23' Any in-
formation about the product or the service-that is, any (truthful) informa-
tion which will either decrease or increase 0-will make the consumer bet-
ter off. But absent such additional information about the product, the con-
sumer's best strategy is to choose x* where her expected cost is minimal.
EMin is, therefore, the consumer's reservation price for information. The
consumer will be willing to pay any sum of money for information regard-
ing the product's qualities so long as her minimum expected error cost,
EMin, is higher or equal to the cost of information.
2. The Producer's Strategy
Proposition 3: The stronger the consumer's subjective belief that the
product is of high quality (0 > /2), the higher the number of units the buyer
will purchase.








E=O EI=E#=Eo E a, E2=Eg=E E=Eu.
- Producer's Choice -Consumer's Choice
Figure 3: Summary of the Two-Step Minimization Process (For 0 =
/2).
231 The model can be easily extended to cases in which the consumer has prior information, so that
0 6 /2. It can also be extended to discuss cases of false optimism (for example, when the consumer
possess a belief of 0 = 0.75 when she should have, based upon the objective information available to
her, a lower 0) and false pessimism.
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Proposition 3 is crucial to understanding the Trademark Act. The
profit-maximizing seller, being aware of Proposition 3, faces two options:
He can either (a) increase the quality of his product and convey that infor-
mation or (b) produce a low-quality product and convey false information
about its credence qualities."' If he chooses to raise his product quality, he
can convey that information by using a trademark. "Splenda," for example,
has acquired a secondary meaning in the mind of consumers as denoting a
"no calorie sweetener that's made from sugar, so it tastes like sugar" that
"is suitable for people with diabetes." '33 A trademark that provides positive
information will increase 0 (such that 0 > Y2) and lead to higher consump-
tion (the mechanism is discussed below).234 This is illustrated in Figure 3 by
a movement from the point of ignorance (Ig) to point F. At F, the buyer's
error costs decrease further (EF < Eg = EMin, Q, > Qig), resulting in an in-
crease in total welfare. Similarly, if the mark provides negative information
about the product's credence qualities (for example, when governmental
regulations such as labeling requirements require the seller to do so), al-
though the buyer will purchase less than she would had she been at the ig-
norance point (Ig), her error cost will nevertheless unambiguously decrease.
This is illustrated by a movement from the point of ignorance to point G,
where EG < EIg and Q2 < QIg.
Rather than improving its product, the seller may choose to cheat. In
this model, cheating is plausible and likely to occur because it is hard or
even impossible for the buyer to verify the product's credence qualities.
The buyer cannot check (at a non-prohibitive cost) the active ingredients or
the processes or location of manufacture. She is at the mercy of the seller
whose product she chose to purchase. Thus, sellers of low quality products
may choose to defraud consumers by providing false information to in-
crease sales without incurring the cost of improving their products. For
232 Of course the seller always has the option of producing a low-quality product without engaging
in fraud, but such behavior does not pose any concerns and is not discussed.
233 Splenda® No Calorie Sweetener FAQs, http://www.splenda.com/page.jhtml?id=splenda/faqs/
nocalorie.inc#ql. Splenda® is made through a patented process that starts with sugar and converts it to
sucralose, a non-carbohydrate no-calorie sweetener. See id.
234 The information conveyed by a mark will always be "positive" (in the sense that it will make
the product more desirable). Each product can be thought of a function of a set of attributes, and pro-
ducers will use their marks to highlight positive attributes of their product. McDonald's, for example,
can use its mark to impart information about its burgers' taste and uniformity but perhaps not their
nutritional value. Linguist Roger Shuy has narrowed down the message conveyed by the McDonald's
mark to "basic, convenient, inexpensive and standardized." ROGER W. SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN
TRADEMARK DISPUTES 99 (2002). One court has held that the prefLx "Mc" denotes "quality, service,
cleanliness and value," or "Q.S.V.C." Quality Inns Int'l Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198,
203 (D. Mass. 1988).
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example, a seller could tout its cheese as a "Roquefort" although it was not
made in France. In that case, the defrauded consumer would believe she is
at point F but would actually be at point H, where her error costs are higher
than at the point of ignorance (Ig). Cheating, as Figure 3 demonstrates,
would result in increased sales but would reduce consumers' welfare, at a
magnitude of EH - EMmn. Furthermore, the model shows that even where
fraud is implausible, one would expect low-quality manufacturers to say
very little or nothing about their products' credence attributes. By not con-
veying any information, low-quality sellers may be able to increase their
sales.235 Not internalizing the buyer's error cost, the seller will be able to
sell x* units at the point where 0 = V2. But this will be at some substantial
cost to consumers.
The seller can influence the buyer' subjective beliefs in several ways,
one of which is using a trademark. This can be formally presented as:
(7) 0 = V, + 8LT
where 8 is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the trademark con-
veys the information that the product is of high quality and equal to -1 if
trademark conveys that the product is of low quality; T is an index of the
trademark's strength (T is equal to 0 where the product is not branded and
increases with the trademark's strength );236 and L, which I assume to be
constant, is the marginal change in the probability 0 caused by an increase
in T. Substituting 0 in Equation 6 with its formulation in Equation 7 and
235 The model leads to the conclusion that a pooling equilibrium will occur. In this regard, the
model differs from the approach in the signaling literature, which views the presence of a warranty as a
signal of a good product and its absence as a signal of a bad one. See generally William Boulding &
Amna Kirmani, A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory: Do Consumers
Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?, 20 J. CONSUMER RES. 111 (1993) (arguing that experimen-
tal results tend to show that "consumer responses to warranties are consistent with the behavioral as-
sumptions of signaling theory"). In a trademark setting, on the other hand, the fact that a mark does not
convey information about credence qualities (i.e., there is a low or zero branding level) will not lead to a
separating equilibrium. For a separating equilibrium to occur, consumers must be able to observe and
compare the same attribute in different products. Because a warranty is a signal of only one attribute-
performance--consumers can infer that seller who does not offer a warranty has a product with low
performance. Trademarks, unlike warranties, are used to impart information about many different at-
tributes. Every seller can use its mark to convey information about the attribute for which its product is
most valued. One could use the mark to convey a information about a certain taste, another to convey a
certain smell, a third to convey the existence or absence of an ingredient, a fourth to convey a process
and so on. In such a setting the only thing a consumer may infer from the existence of a mark is that the
attribute for which the mark has gained a secondary meaning may be the strongest quality of that prod-
uct or at least a desirable one.
236 The magnitude of T is a primarily a function of advertising.
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differentiating the achieved expression with respect to T reveals that the
stronger the trademark is, the smaller the expected error costs become.
(8)E(eQ._ (a,-a2)2 1 6 2L2T2]  (a.-a2)2 I L2T2
2b 4 2b 4
Proposition 4: From Equation 8, it follows that where information is
truthful, the buyer's error costs are minimized regardless of the trademark's
negative or positive value. Whether the trademark conveys low or high
quality (whether 8 = -1 or 6 = 1), its strength (that is an increase in T) re-
duces E(e). This is illustrated in Figure 3's depiction of the producer's
strategy.
B. Extending the Model: Persuasive Branding
I now turn to snobbism. I use interchangeably "famous" and "persua-
sive" to describe marks which influence buyers' demand by adding psycho-
logical freight. In the basic model above, trademarks always reduced buy-
ers' error cost and increase sales by imparting information about the prod-
uct's credence qualities, but in the case of persuasive marks, the outcome is
ambiguous. For persuasive marks, a trademark serves two roles. First, as in
any intra-brand setting, it reduces consumers' error cost and leads to an
increase in sales (where 8 = 1). Second, it also creates a pleasant feeling or
portrays an image that makes the product more desirable or appealing. In its
first hat, as a cost-reducer, a trademark has no impact on prices. In its sec-
ond hat, when it creates an aura or a product appeal, it does. A persuasive
mark increases the demand for the product, as illustrated in Figure 3, and
thus increases the product's price.
Formally, instead of the somewhat naive description provided in
Equations 1 and 2, I denote the inverse demand curve for a product whose
trademarks enjoy high popularity (e.g., Ferrari, L'Oreal etc.) as follows:
(9) D-1 (p, f, n): P = a + XfT,n, - bQ;
D(p, f, n): Q = aPa +f(T,,n) 1b b b b b
where f (for "fame") is a popularity index, which is a function of the
trademark strength T, the number of competing firms n, and other factors E
(such as pleasant design). I assume that an increase in T increases the prod-
uct's popularity (fT > 0) but that the marginal contribution is decreasing
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(f'T < 0). That is, the stronger the trademark, the smaller the contribution of
an additional unit of trademark strength to the product's popularity. The
demand for the product is thus dependant upon the price, P, and increases
with an increase in the popularity, which implies Wy > 0. This specification
no longer assumes that an increase in T has no influence on prices. In the
case of persuasive marks, the seller has some ability to influence the price
due to the popularity of his product in the marketplace. I also assume that
the demand is influenced by the number of firms in the market, n. For ex-
ample, in a geographic market where only Armani suits are available, I
expect the demand to be higher than in a market where consumers can pur-
chase Armani and Hugo Boss, ceteris paribus. This implies that D'n < 0, fn
< 0 for every increase in n. For this reason, it was argued above that allow-
ing producers to sell the same tangible product under different labels for
different prices would enhance competition and reduce prices. This could
lead to increased production and more vibrant competition in the psychic
sphere. The introduction of more firms (that is, increases in n) reduces "f'
and leads to a decrease in the fame effect discussed below.
Holding the number of firms, n, constant and repeating the methodol-
ogy employed for the basic model above allows calculation of the correlat-
ing quantities QE and QF (analogous to QA and Qc above), the error span
(dIQF - QE), the error costs as a function of T, its maximum and minimum,
and the quantity Q* (see Figure 4):
(10) QE - a 2 + W
f - Pl , QF = a l + f - P, , dIQF - QEI =d= aI - a 2
b b b
x bx
2  O(a1 -a 2 )
2
(11) E' (ex = E(ex - - 0 (al - a 2 )X +
2 2b
(a, - a2 ) 2  M0(a, -a2)(12) Max E' (e) at 2b Min E'(e) at x'* b x
(13) E' (eQ*) = E e Q) = (a, - a2 ) 2 [1 -6 2 L2 T 2 12b 4
(14) x* (al -a 2 ) 6LT(al -a 2 ) 0 <x* <(a, -a 2)Ib
2b b
Note that Equations 10-14 are identical to those yielded under the ba-
sic model. This is because an increase in T does not impact the error span
(dIQF - QE = dlQc - QA = (a, - a2)/b) and consequently, x'* = x*. Thus the
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minimum and maximum error costs remain the same. The increase in T
does, however, change the quantity Q*':
(15)Q*=QA+X * = a 1 +a 2 -2Po + LT (a, -a2)2b b
(16) Q* QE +  x* = a +a 2 -2P + T(a -a 2 ) +
2b b
[ f(T) A (T) - Po
b b
This enables a graphical representation of the dynamics of persuasive
branding. An increase in the trademark strength T has three effects.237 First,
an increase in T increases the "fame" of the product and makes it more ap-
pealing. This, in tum, increases the demand for the product at a magnitude
of Wf/b. I refer to this impact as the "fame effect." Figure 4 illustrates the
fame effect as a right shift of the demand curves. If all else is held equal
(specifically, P remains Po) this shift would increase the quantity the buyer
is willing to purchase and shift the error span from [QA, Qc] to [QB, QD],
such that QB > QA and QD > Qc. This, in turn, causes the point of ignorance
to increase so that the new point of ignorance, x19 , would shift to K (QD <
Q'lgK < QB).
237 Equation (16) is broken down into four components. The first expression is the demand for the
physical product at the point of ignorance (thus it is independent of T). The second expression illustrates
the informational effect: it is the increase in demand for the physical product due to the favorable infor-
mation the trademark conveys about the product's physical qualities. The third expression is the demand
for the intangible product, which piggybacks on the physical one (i.e., the fame, status or satisfaction
the consumer gains from consuming the product. The forth expression is the price effect caused by the
persuasive efforts.
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Figure 4: The Impact of Persuasive Marks on Consumers' Demand
But the increase in fame also causes a price effect which reduces the
quantity by (P1 - P0)/b > 0, where P1 is the new price level. This is illus-
trated by a shift on the demand curves from the segment [B, D] to [E, F],
which in turn causes the ignorance point to shift from K to I. Finally, an
increase in trademark level strength provides more intra-brand information
about the product's credence qualities, and so increases the quantity pur-
chased by moving the consumer away from the new ignorance point I-an
informational effect. This effect is of magnitude 5L(T - To)(a l - a2)/b and
causes a subsequent rightward shift on the horizontal line [I, F]. The three
effects can be shown by calculating the difference in quantity before and
after the increase in T:
(17) dlQ'* - Q*I - -fo P - Po + 6L(T - Toa- a 2
b b b
In sum, persuasive branding will cause the following changes:
(a) A fame effect of V (fl A ) ; f = f(T)
b
(b) A price effect of - P0 ; p = P(T)
b
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(c) An informational effect of 6L(T - TO) a
l - a2
b
Proposition 5: Ignoring the cost of branding (or where branding is
costless), the informational effect is finite and reaches maximum.
Proposition 5 means that a monotonic increase in T will close, at one
point, the informational gap, leaving only the price and fame effects. The
intuition is simple. With an increase in T, the buyer receives more informa-
tion about the product's credence qualities. At a certain level of T, denoted
by TIMax, the buyer has received all of the information she needs about the
physical attributes of the product. She knows that she faces D, rather than
D2 (assuming 8 = 1, her subjective belief will be 0 = 1). Once the consumer
has full information, she moves from the costly point of ignorance to Qc
where her error costs are 0-point F in Figure 3. At that point, further in-
vestment in trademark (an increase in T such that T > TIMax) will yield no
additional informational effect. Thus, in a world where persuasive branding
is prohibited, investment in trademarks will be finite, even when the cost of
branding is zero.
But in the case of persuasive marks, the producer may continue to in-
crease T above the informational maximum (T > TIMax). This is because
trademarks are not only a means to convey information about a product's
physical qualities; they also create a new intangible product which piggy-
backs on the tangible one. Once the trademark has provided full informa-
tion about the product's tangible credence qualities, the two demand curves
denoted by D, and D2 in Figures 1 and 4 collapse into one: the higher de-
mand curve (if 6 = 1). Because the information gap is finite (the error span
does not change with an increase in T), the informational process must
reach an end, at which point the two demand curves will become one. As of
that point, the only two effects remaining are the fame effect-the extent to
which increasing trademark strength increases the value of the intangible
product-and the price effect.
This analysis explains one of the major flaws of the soft-liners' ap-
proach. Soft-liners justify persuasive branding because of its informational
effect. They fail to recognize, however, that such an effect is not un-
bounded. At a certain level of branding (TImX), a famous trademark con-
veys the information that the product is of high quality. Any further in-
vestment does not serve any informational purpose. Even the soft-liners,
then, will side with the hard-liners and argue that any branding level T such
that T > TMax is wasteful. The model above, however, proves that even
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where the informational process ends, branding is not wasteful: It creates an
intangible product that consumers value.238
Proposition 6: An increase in T will unambiguously lead to an in-
crease in both the purchased quantity, Q*, and x1g (Q*' > Q*, xlg' > xIg) so
long as pf > p1 - p0 , where Pi is the new price level.
Corollary 6: From Proposition 7, it follows that so long as
Vpf > pi - p 0 , an increase in T leads to increases in output and prices.
Proposition 6 and its corollary imply that the anomaly of an increase
in both price and output is possible. This phenomenon has been discussed
often in the literature of conspicuous goods. 239 The conclusion to be drawn
from that literature is that elitists (consumers who gain utility from the fact
that other consumers cannot purchase a certain product) face an upward-
sloping demand curve. Thus, an increase in price causes an increase in con-
sumption; because fewer people can afford to buy the high-priced product,
it becomes a better a signal of exclusivity and therefore is more demanded
by those who can afford it. Like the model presented in this article, the lit-
erature of conspicuous goods introduces social desires into the traditional
consumer decision-making theory. Its focus, though, is relative consump-
tion: the utility that elitists and conformists derive from a product is a func-
tion of the residual or aggregate demand of other consumers. Also, it fo-
cuses only on visible status-signaling goods and ignores the psychological
satisfaction a product may confer. Thus, it is a prerequisite in that literature
that a product must be conspicuous to convey the message of uniqueness or
conformism.240 For this reason, the literature of conspicuous goods cannot
explain the high premiums charged by sellers of inconspicuous goods.
238 Empirical data demonstrates this flaw. See supra text accompanying note 18. If, as the soft-
liners argue, persuasive advertising provides only information about the physical product, advertising
outlays would be less where the cost of advertising and the dissemination of information are less. Yet
the data show that despite the Intemet and other cost-reducing mechanisms, advertising expenditures
continue to increase. Id.
239 The literature on conspicuous goods distinguishes between "elitists" (sometimes "snobs," but
with a meaning different than that employed in this article), who prefer unique products (i.e., consumers
whose purchase decision is based on residual demand), and "conformists," who prefer goods which are
popular amongst their peers. See infra note 240.
240 Wilfred Amaldoss & Sanjay Jain, Pricing of Conspicuous Goods: A Competitive Analysis of
Social Effects, 42 J. MKTG. RES. 30, 30-31 (2005); see also GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY,
SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 25H (2000); THORSTEIN
VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS 52-76 (The
Modem Library 1961) (1899); Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory
of Consumers'Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON., 183, 189 (1950) (defining Conformists-the opposite of Elit-
ists-as those who prefer goods which are popular amongst their peers).
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Figure 5: The Expected Change in Q and P as a Function of an In-
crease in T.
The model advanced in this article, on the other hand, suggests that
snobbism (willingness to pay more for the same physical product that can
be purchased for less)1 4' can occur even with a downward-sloping demand
curve. The model shows that under certain conditions an increase in price
and output may appear simultaneously: not as a cause (increase in price)
and effect (increase in output) but rather as byproducts of an increase in
branding efforts. This can be seen in Figures 4 and 5. A small increase in T
will create a fame effect, which will shift the demand curves and thus the
error span from dlQc - QAI to dIQD - QBI, and a price effect, which will
further shift the error span to dIQE - QFI, where the new price level is P1 .242
The point of ignorance shifts to point K and then to point I, respectively. So
long as the increase in price is such that P < P2, the point of ignorance will
increase, which implies an increase in total consumption. At a price level of
P2 the error span is dIQH - QGI, where QA = QG, Qc = QH, and the point of
ignorance at its pre-branding level. At price levels of above P2, quantity
may still increase, but at a decreasing pace. Here the informational effect
and the price effect work in opposite directions. The error span (and there-
fore the new point of ignorance) is left of the original, resulting in a de-
crease in quantity absent an informational effect of greater magnitude. If,
however, the informational effect is still positive and of greater magnitude
than the price effect, an increase in consumption at a lower pace is ex-
pected. Figure 5 illustrates that at prices above P 3, where the price effect is
of greater magnitude than the informational and fame effects, consumption
will decrease.
241 For a similar definition, see Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a
Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 350 (1996) (defining "Veblen Effects"
as "a willingness to pay a higher price for a functionally equivalent goods, aris[ing] from the desire to
signal wealth.").
242 Note that dIQc - QAI = diQD - QB[ = dIQE - QF-.
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C. Disaggregating Informative Branding from Persuasive Branding
Many scholars distinguish between persuasive branding and informa-
tive branding, praising the latter and demonizing the former. This model so
far assumes only one type of branding, T, whose impact on both the infor-
mational and the fame effect is in the same direction. In other words, the
dynamic of the model is such that every increase in T provides more infor-
mation about the product's physical qualities and creates a fame effect.
Thus, in its current formulation, the model is incapable of describing the
case in which a trademark is highly famous and, at the same time, provides
only fuzzy information about the product; or a trademark that provides
much information without creating a luxurious aura. Examples of both sce-
narios are abundant. Beer manufacturers, for example, heavily advertise
their products using persuasive ads which contain very little informational
value. Pharmaceuticals, on the other hand, are mainly touted for their me-
dicinal qualities rather than the image they project.
Only a very modest modification to the model is necessary to distin-
guish between persuasive branding and informational branding. There is no
need to assume that some advertisements are wholly informational while
others are purely emotional. Indeed, every branding effort is a hybrid. I
denote 0 < a < 1 as the fragment of the branding efforts (for example a
commercial) which conveys information about the product's credence
qualities. I refer to "aT" as the mark's informative level. By using a it is
possible to redefine 0 and the error function in Equations 7 and 8 to be:
(18) 0 = /2 + LaT
(19)E(eOQ)= (a, -a 2 )
2 162L2a 2T2]
2b 4
(20) x*= (a-a2) +LaT(a -a 2) ;0<x*<(a,-a 2)/b
2b b
Similarly, I define 0 < 13 < 1 as the percentage of branding efforts
which appeals to consumers' emotions and psychology. Substituting for f
the function f = XFf-T, which, consistent with the requirements above, is
increasing with an increase in T at the decreasing pace fT > 0, f'T < 0,
243
yields the following outcomes:
243 It may well be the case the both a, [3 =1. If so, branding efforts will increase both the informa-
tional and fame effects, as was the case prior to this extension of the model.
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(21) Q*= QE+X* = a1 +a 2 + Pf(T)- P(PT) + bLaT (a -a2)
2b b b
___ a I + P2 O fAT- Pl(~tr)(a-)
a, +a 2 + + LaT ( a t - a 2 )
2b b b
_ f - /fo P, - P0 6La(T T)al -a =
(22) dlQ'* - Q* b b b
J _(_-i -_0) PI(P) - Po T -a 2
b b + La(Tj- 
a, b
CONCLUSION
This article offers a new rational basis for persuasive branding and
anti-dilution law. It argues that, because of the state of technology and so-
cial norms, consumers cannot purchase status and prestige apart from
physical products. Nor can they signal their refined taste without being
considered rude or presumptuous. Rather, they must purchase a package
which includes not only the physical product, but also information about
that product and an image or satisfying feeling. To build on Demsetz's ex-
ample, an orthodox Jew is willing to pay more for food that is market ko-
sher because of its physical characteristics (e.g., nutritional value), the in-
formation the mark conveys about a physical credence quality (the kosher
mark informs the consumer that the food was prepared in accordance with
Jewish tradition), and the mental satisfaction it offers (religious practice).
These three demands are commingled.
The framework established in this article helps to clear the fog which
surrounds the nebulous anti-dilution theory, and to allay the constitutional
concerns which have been raised recently by scholars. It shows that persua-
sive branding and anti-dilution law are different sides of the same coin: the
latter protects the value that the former creates in a mark. Contrary to com-
mon wisdom, however, both producers and consumers benefit from anti-
dilution law. For producers, anti-dilution is forward looking, protecting a
mark's ability to attract new customers. For consumers, it is backward
looking, protecting consumers' investments from the hazards of an exter-
nality. Because consumers buy both a physical product and psychological
freight but gain control only over the physical product, a third party may
dilute the intangible psychological product for which the consumer paid
dearly. By providing a cause of action to producers, the latter are able to
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serve their traditional role as the avengers of the public. Not only do they
protect themselves, but they also protect consumers' intellectual property.
Thus, anti-dilution theory cannot legitimately be christened "a radical and
imprudent alternative to the consumer protection model of trademark
rights."2"
This framework also leads to the conclusion that producers should be
able to command different prices for physically identical products bearing
different marks, without being subject to antitrust liability or inquiry. Bor-
den not only lacks any economic basis, but it may also thrust monopoly
power upon producers. It stands in direct contrast to courts' long-standing
practice of defending consumers in their beliefs. Remedying this anomaly
in the law will lead to an increase in output and welfare, the paramount end
of antitrust law.
Finally, this framework supports the conclusion that certain markets
may experience both an increase in price and output. This phenomenon
should not lead to the conclusion of an upward-sloping demand curve.
More likely, people are willing to pay more because they receive more, and
this occurrence is consistent with a downward-sloping demand curve.
APPENDIX A (ECON PURE 16)
I. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proposition 1: x* which brings the expected cost to a minimum will be
always positive and the consumer will thus always choose Q* such that
QA<Q*<Qc. Put differently, in a world with uncertainty, the buyer will
never chose Q* such that Q* is equal to either QA or Qc.
The proof of proposition 1 is straightforward. From equation (5), the
first order condition of the error function in equation (4), it follows that
x*>0 because both the nominator and the denominator are positive (a1-a2>0
and b,0>0). Because the second order condition of equation (4) is always
positive (b>O) it implies a 'minimum'. Thus, only when the buyer decides
to purchase x* such that x*>0 (or Q*>QA) will she be able to minimize her
error costs. Equation (5) implies not only that Q*>QA but also that
QA<Q*<Qc. To show that we need to derive QA and Qc by solving equa-
tions (1) and (2) for P0. This yields: QA=(a 2-Po)/b; Qc =(a1-Po)/b; Qc-
QA=(al-a 2)/b. Because the quantity x* chosen by the buyer (see equation
(5)) is equals the expression in (1.2) (which stands for QC-QA) times the
probability of error, 0, and because 0<0<1, it follows that QA<Q*<QC.
244 Klieger, supra note 28, at 795.
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II. PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Corollary 1: From proposition 1 and equation (6) it follows that the
expected error, E(e), is always positive and is unambiguously smaller than
the extreme cases where the consumer purchases Q=QA or Q=Qc. That is
O<E(eQ*)<E(e Q9 =E(e Qc).
I derive equation (6) by substituting x* in equation (5) for x in equa-
tion (4). Equation (6) is the buyer's demand for information. Because b>0
and 0<0<1 it follows that the expected error function (and thus the demand
for information) is always positive. Moreover, it is possible to prove that
the expected cost function is at maximum when Q*=QA or Qc. This is
shown by substituting the values for x the yields Q=QA (x=0) and Q=Qc
(x=Qc-QA=(a1-a 2)/b) in equation 4, which yields in turn the following ex-
pressions: E(QA)=0(al-a 2)
2/2b; and E(Qc)=(1-0)(a 1 -a2 )
2/2b. The two latter
expressions are equal and at maximum where 0=1,0 respectively. Because
0<0<1 it also follows that 0 < [0(1-0)] (al-a 2)
2/2b < 0(al-a 2)
2/2b, (1-0)(al-
a2)
2/2b < 1 and thus the expected error will always be smaller than E(eQa) or
E(eQc). That is: O<E(eQ*)<E(eQa)=E(eQc).
III. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proposition 2: The higher is the difference in quality dial - a2l (the
larger is the error span), the higher will be the maximal error the consumer
incurs
This proof is straight forward. Because a, -a 2, 1 (I measure the different
in quality in natural numbers), then the bigger is the value of (al-a 2) the
higher is the error cost in equation (4).
IV. PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 3
Proposition 3: The stronger the consumer's subjective belief that the
product is of high quality (0 > /) the higher will be the number of units
purchased by the buyer.
The proof of proposition 3 is achieved by differentiating equation (5)
with respect to 0, which yields the positive expression (al-a 2)/b>0.
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